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Abstract:  
This paper examines the different ways public transit service providers and governments 
generate revenue through land value capture (LVC) tools in London, New York and Toronto. In 
this paper, LVC is examined as a levy that captures the betterment of land values caused by a 
government funded transit infrastructure project, specifically subway systems. LVC provides the 
public purse a mechanism to generate revenue from augmented land values attributable to their 
subway project, which is then allocated towards project debt repayment.  The City of London 
applied the Business Rate Supplement (BRS) to non-residential properties coupled with a 
Community Infrastructure levy (CIL) on new developments to generate revenue for the Elizabeth 
Subway Line project. To pay for the extension of the Number 7 Subway Line the City of New 
York implemented a combination of; Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT), Payment in Lieu of 
Mortgage Recording Tax (PILOMRT), Eastern Rail Yard Transferrable Development Rights 
(ERY TDR) and District Improvement Bonuses (DIB) throughout the Hudson Yards site. A 
portion of the City of Toronto’s SmartTrack project will be funded through a municipal version 
of tax increment financing (TIF) based on TIF zones along the SmartTrack corridor. Each case 
study is evaluated based on LVC’s ability to recuperate funding for project debt repayment and 
the effectiveness of facilitating new development surrounding a station stop.  
A secondary research objective of this paper is an analysis of the legislation in each city, 
that allows for different land value capture mechanisms to be implemented. In 2009, the United 
Kingdom’s Federal government passed the Business Rate Supplement Act, whereas, the State of 
New York passed the Municipal Redevelopment Law in 1984. The Ontario legislature gave 
Royal Assent to the Tax Increment Financing Act in 2006, but the province has yet to implement 
regulations for the legislation, rendering the legislation unusable. Through first person interviews 
I discover two potential reasons why Ontario’s provincial cabinet never implemented regulations 
for Ontario’s Tax Increment Financing Act (2006). My findings indicate that the Province of 
Ontario was unwilling to share revenue from the Education Tax Increment during the 2008 
recession. Secondly, there was a lack of bureaucratic will to implement regulations for the Tax 
Increment Financing Act (2006) due to a change in Ministerial leadership.  It is determined that 
the legislation, or lack thereof, is the greatest determinant if a value capture policy will be 
successful in capturing any increase in land value.    
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Foreword: 
A requirement for graduate students in the Masters of Environmental Studies program at York 
University is to secure a field placement related to their plan of study. The field experience is an 
opportunity for graduate students to pragmatically apply critical thinking systems towards real 
life scenarios. My first field placement took place over the summer of 2018, where I worked as a 
student policy planner on the Yonge Subway Extension. It was during my placement where I 
first encountered land value capture (LVC). During the 2018 summer, there was also a provincial 
election race that created a feeling of uncertainty if the Yonge Subway Extension would receive 
provincial funding. I came to understand LVC as a potential alternative funding source, 
potentially alleviating the reliance of government subsidies to fund portions public transit 
projects.  
This major paper is a key component in completing my plan of study and Masters in 
Environmental Studies graduate program.  The scope of my paper was purposely chosen to attain 
accreditation by the Ontario Professional Planners Institute (OPPI). My paper extensively 
examines how land value capture can be used as a quasi-land-use planning tool in two distinct 
ways; to generate revenue to fund transit infrastructure projects and secondly, to encourage 
development on underutilized land. I formulated my plan of study to explore how effective land 
value capture (LVC) mechanisms are at capturing the increases of property values that are a 
direct result of a publicly funded transit project. This research paper focuses on three individual 
case studies from London, New York and Toronto. I choose the city examples due to each 
example implementing a different type of LVC to fund a portion of their respective rail transit 
project.  
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1.Introduction to Land Value Capture 
Ontario provincial planning policies encourage development near transit stations to 
ensure public systems have adequate ridership. Ontario’s Growth Plan for the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe (2017) requires areas surrounding subway stations to have a minimum density target 
of 200 residents and jobs per hectare. To achieve density targets, the built form surrounding 
subways stations often feature transit-oriented designs, i.e. high-density and mixed-use buildings, 
multi-modal transit connectivity and enhanced walkability (Atkinson-Palombo, 2010). The cost 
of a private housing unit in close proximity to a subway station demands an increased value due 
to enhanced connectivity and convenience (Nelson, 1999).  
In this paper, I have selected three case studies of land value capture where transit 
infrastructure projects are government initiated and funded. These projects are taking place in the 
City of London (UK) New York City (US) and Toronto (Ontario). Despite the differences in 
contexts, planning systems and legal frameworks, there is an interesting statistical correlation 
where publicly funded transit projects are generating profits for private land developers at little 
to no cost for the developer.  How can the governments hold developers accountable to pitch 
their fair share towards the capital and or maintenance costs of a publicly funded transit project? 
This paper investigates the use of different land value capture instruments as a means to 
recapture some of the increase in residential and commercial property values that are a direct 
result of a publicly funded transit project. 
Two of the strongest examples that highlight the usefulness of land value capture are the 
cases of London, UK and New York, NY. In London, the Department for Transport (DfT), 
Greater London Authority (GLA) and Transport for London (TfL) implemented the business rate 
supplement (BRS) tax. Under the BRS mechanism, qualifying non-residential properties were 
charged a rateable value, the revenue attributed from the BRS aided in paying for a portion of the 
Elizabeth Line Subway extension. New York City implemented a tax policy ‘payments in lieu of 
taxes (PILOT)’, coupled with the sale of transferable development rights to fund the Line 7 
Subway extension. Both London and New York cases exemplify the necessary legislation and 
planning policies that allowed land value capture mechanisms to flourish. In juxtaposition, the 
third case study displays a struggling version of land value capture in Ontario, Canada. The 
provincial government in Ontario introduced the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006), yet the 
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TIF Act (2006) does not have any legislative regulations. Without regulations, public agencies 
and local governments in Ontario are unable to use tax increment financing to fund portions of 
their respective capital project.  
I evaluate the effectiveness of land value capture mechanisms based on two quantitative 
criteria: first, land value capture’s ability to recuperate revenue for project debt repayment; and 
second, the effectiveness of facilitating new development surrounding a transit station stop. I 
also investigate and analyze the legislative mechanisms responsible for permitting land value 
capture policies in each city case. Tax-based land value capture mechanism’s like tax-increment 
financing (TIF) or payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) require legislative authority for their use 
(Alterman, 2012). Ontario’s Tax Increment Financing Act (2006) does not have regulations, so 
there is no means for transit agencies or local governments to access the revenue of the education 
tax increment expected to occur as a result of a transit project. This was certainly the case for the 
Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension, because the government of Ontario did not implement 
TIF regulations, the City of Toronto and York Region had to locate alternative project funding. 
The case study of Toronto exemplifies that legislation, or lack thereof, is the greatest determinant 
if a value capture policy will be successful in capturing any increase in land value.    
 My paper does provide a word of caution of the gentrifying effects of development and 
LVC. Land values must be augmented for LVC to effectively generate revenue, but research 
indicates that as local areas are transformed through intensified uses and increased dwelling 
costs, it can certainly lead to displacement and gentrification of local communities. Although 
gentrification and displacement are not within the scope of my paper I do acknowledge their 
inherent importance in city planning and necessity for future research.  
Theories of Land Values and Tax  
 
Political economist Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations in 1776, where he outlined 
the economic relationships responsible for augmented land rent values. Smith (1776) defines 
land rent as the price paid for the use of a land parcel, and argues the greatest achievable rent 
value a land owner can attain is the amount a tenant can afford to pay. Regardless of the 
condition of the land a rent is demanded by the landlord, however, land that received an 
improvement is eligible to collect a premium rent. One form of land improvement according to 
Smith (1776), is the integration of properties with local markets; 
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Land in the neighbourhood of a town gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a 
distant part of the country. Though it may cost no more labour to cultivate the one than 
the other, it must always cost more to bring the produce of the distant land to market. 
(p.83)  
  
Providing efficient access to city markets and pools of labour through improved infrastructure 
networks is essential for the augmentation of land rent values. This relationship is more evident 
than ever in 2019, as properties demand increased rents when in proximity to transit hubs that 
connect users to employment opportunities and markets.  
Henry George (1879) wrote Progress and Poverty, which I perceive to be one of best 
explanations of how land taxes can mitigate land speculation. Speculation is occurring in present 
day Ontario, where private land developers are withholding the development of land until 
publicly funded transit investments are completed. The subway functions as an improvement to 
the property, allowing land developers to demand the highest land rent possible (SRRA, 2018). 
Mitigating speculation is important, George (1879) highlights that speculation can become 
detrimental to regional economies as, “speculation inflates land values, reduces wages and 
interest, and thereby checks production.” (p.99). In addition to George’s critique of speculation, 
it can potentially lead to sprawl. As speculators purchase surplus quantities of land, rent values 
increase and less expensive rent is sought in the peripheral zones of a region.  
In 1817, David Ricardo wrote On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 
where he argues that land has three inherent qualities; first, it is in fixed supply, second, it is not 
uniform in quality, and third, some parcels have a locational advantage over others (Ricardo, 
1817). In alignment with Ricardo (1817), George (1879) notes that since land is in fixed supply, 
ownership of land has no value. Land values are augmented by merging ownership and 
productivity, but until someone purchases property for production, a parcel of land will continue 
to have no value (p.65).  Producers, like farmers, are constantly competing to use land putting 
them at the mercy of the landowner who can increase the rent of the most productive land. Since 
land is in fixed supply, a land tax can mitigate land speculation while increasing competition 
among land owners;  
Taxing land makes landowners pay more, it gives them no power to obtain more. For 
there is no way this can reduce the supply of land. On the contrary, it forces those who 
hold land on speculation to sell or rent for what they can get. (George, 1879, p.151) 
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George’s (1879) assertion implies that land taxes increase competition amongst land owners 
resulting in more efficient use of land. The work of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Henry 
George, highlight two key ideas why land value capture is not only feasible, but desirable; 
1) Property improvements which improve accessibility to local or regional markets, demand 
increased rent values; and 
2) Since land is in fixed supply, a land tax will not decrease supply, rather it can mitigate 
land speculation while encouraging development.  
This theory is applicable in 2019, as tax-based land value capture mechanisms encourage 
developers to be as productive as possible on the land they own, making speculation less 
profitable. Indeed, recent literature indicates that LVC tools are an effective means of 
encouraging property owners to develop their land rather than withholding it for an increased 
future market value, mitigating land speculation (Rybeck, 2004). To this end, the next section 
will examine how public rail infrastructure can augment residential and commercial land values 
near station stops.  
Land Value in Proximity to Public Rail Transit  
 
Public transit infrastructure, especially subways, can improve real-estate values. Planners, 
economists and academics are often contested when asked to delineate and agree upon the 
factors associated with public transit that improve land values. Literature on the subject suggest a 
multitude of attributes, such as;  
• Proximity and accessibility to stations, distance and time; 
• Property type effected, residential, commercial, industrial; 
• Form of transit; LRT, Subway etc;  
• Neighbourhood built form; 
• Existing monetary indicators, absolute and rental prices; 
• Local real-estate market performance. 
In my opinion, proximity to transit is a factor that needs to be looked at carefully: if land 
values do not improve when in proximity to transit stations, then land value capture is not 
applicable. Research conducted by Armstrong (1994) demonstrates that commuter rail enhances 
residential property values: “single-family residences located in communities that have a 
commuter rail station have a market value that is approximately 6.7 percent greater than that of 
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residences in other communities.” (p.97). Similar results were mirrored in Wang’s (2010) 
research of residential property values within 1.5 km of a rapid transit line that is connected to a 
central business district. Wang’s findings indicate that the prices of residential real-estate within 
0.5 km of a rapid transit station sought on average, a 7.2 % bump in property values (p.45). 
Evidence of residential property values increasing near rail transit could potentially be linked to a 
correlation amongst a property’s proximity to transit, which was originally put forth by Alonso 
(1964), Muth (1969) and Mills (1972), known as the Alonso-Muth-Mills (AMM) model (Higgins 
and Kanaroglou, 2016, p.612).  The AMM model argues that new transit infrastructure will 
decrease transit costs for land surrounding a station, because the improvement of accessibility 
creates a locational advantage around transit. Locational advantage gives residents access to 
central business districts (CBD), local and global commodity markets, labour pools, 
employment, and entertainment facilities.  Generating access to the above-mentioned areas 
results in people and businesses paying a premium for land near a transit station. The premise 
that real estate values increase near transit is also evident for commercial properties. Arthur 
Nelson’s (1999) research on office commercial real-estate pricing in midtown Atlanta showcases 
that values decrease by $75 per square metre for every metre away from the center of a transit 
station. Proximity to rail stations provide a competitive advantage for commercial businesses by 
creating access to employee pools, which improve property values and encourage economic 
growth (Cohen and Brown, 2017).  
Hess and Almeida (2007) measured rail proximity through straight-line and network 
distances. The straight-line distance, measured in feet, is the shortest possible straight line from a 
residential property to a rail station. Their research stipulated that residential properties within a 
half-mile radius of rail stations demand an additional $2.31 for every foot closer to a light-rail 
station. Hess and Almeida’s second measurement of rail proximity delineates the commuter 
walking distance from a residential unit to a station, referred to as ‘network distance’. Under this 
modelling scenario, houses within a half-mile radius of transit-stations receive $0.99 more per 
every foot closer to a light-rail station (Hess & Almeida, 2007, p.1057). Although the study is 
based on proximity to light rail stations located in Buffalo, New York, the results generally 
indicate that home owners are willing to pay more to be closer to a transit station by 
geographical distance. However, neighbourhood amenity characteristics that are often associated 
with transit-oriented design also demand an increased land rent value. Transit oriented design 
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features contain, “mix-used zoning, open and public spaces, amenity-rich neighbourhoods and 
pedestrian-oriented street design.” (Bartholomew and Ewing, 2011, p.622). A study by Mathur 
and Ferrell (2013) highlights that on average, residential home prices increase by 3.2% per every 
50% reduction in distance from a home to a TOD area. Regardless of the property type, it 
appears that proximity of property to a transit station is key factor in the augmentation of 
property values.  
Land Value Capture Policies 
 
To provide a clear context for this paper it is integral to define the term ‘value capture’. I 
apply the term ‘value capture’, to any policy mechanism that collects the betterment of land 
values resulting from public infrastructure investments or land use regulations. My definition of 
value capture is based on Rachelle Alterman’s (2012) description of ‘direct value capture’, which 
is a “legal obligation for landowners to contribute a share of their community-derived wealth to 
the public pocket.” (p.9). Alterman (2012) insightfully outlines two specific causes of 
betterment:1) Development-based betterment, and 2) Infrastructure-based betterment. 
Development-based betterment is due to planning regulation decisions such as zoning that permit 
increased densities, resulting in increased values. Infrastructure-based betterment causes land 
values to rise through government funded infrastructure projects like subways (p.9). Both 
development-based and infrastructure-based examples will be examined in the later portion of 
this paper.  
Value capture policies can be further categorized as development-based or taxation-
based. Development-based approaches require a local government body or transportation 
authority to develop joint development arrangements to encourage private development near 
transit stations (Medda, 2012, p.158). A Metrolinx (2013) report titled Metrolinx LVC Discussion 
Paper, further delineates two sub-categories of development-based LVC policies. The first 
category shifts responsibility onto the transit provider for the delivery of a development. Such an 
approach is less popular amongst transit-providers as costs are susceptible to changing market 
conditions, real estate prices, and overall capability of a transit agency to spur development.  
Often times transit agencies are not organized to take on the developer role, as developing 
multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects places considerable risk on the public purse. The 
second category is a collaborative agreement amongst the transit provider and a private-
developer, under this scenario the developer is not responsible for constructing a development. 
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Undergoing this method requires a strong and voluntary partnership amongst the private and 
public sector, as both parties are mutually dependent amongst each other. The new transit service 
augments land values by improving connectivity, and the developer is given development rights 
on land surrounding the new transit line (Metrolinx, 2013, p.13). Examples of joint development 
mechanisms are highlighted by Cervero et al. (2004), they include; air-right development, 
ground-lease agreements, station interfacing programs and connection-fees. The goal of these 
approaches is to promote real-estate development in close proximity to transit stations benefiting 
both the public and private sector. Other benefits of development-based benefits are identified by 
Metrolinx (2013) which include the potential to raise more revenue than tax-based policies. 
Developers perceive LVC contributions as a signal that the project is generating increased profits 
(p.11-12).  
Development-based capture policies have a few requirements necessary for their 
successful implementation. First, contributions must be agreed upon early on in the project, 
ideally prior to the rail-line and station locations being solidified. Doing so will create certainty 
around a potential development. A second requirement is that the private-sector must perceive a 
shortfall in project funding, if the project is believed to be fully funded by the public sector there 
will be a reluctance to contribute amongst the private sector to contribute to a LVC mechanism 
(Metrolinx, 2013).  
Tax-based policies attempt to capture the augmented land values created by new transit 
infrastructure through levies and taxes on nearby development. The tax is aimed at properties 
that experience value uplift through increased accessibility to new infrastructure. The revenues 
attained through tax-based capture policies are subsequently redirected to offset the capital and 
operating expenses of an infrastructure project. Some examples of tax-based LVC include; 
special assessment districts, development charges, tax increment financing and land value taxes 
(Metrolinx, 2013). Answering to both David Ricardo and Henry George, tax-based tools can 
potentially mitigate land speculation. Land that is underdeveloped will be subject to a land tax, 
incentivizing developers to develop or increase densities on existing developments to prevent 
their land from standing idle (Medda, 2012). The implementation of tax zones can aid in 
fostering private sector investment. The private sector views special tax zones as an assurance 
that their tax contributions will assist in funding development throughout the area, providing an 
improved financial return.    
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Tax-based policies are an effective means of providing additional financial support to a 
project’s implementation while reducing strain on the public purse and ensuring development 
occurs near new infrastructure. Implementing a tax-based LVC policy approach is not easy. One 
contested issue amongst the public and private partners is determining and agreeing on a 
property’s taxable value following an infrastructure investment. Differentiating the value of land 
that is attributed from general increases and what is attributed to infrastructure improvements is 
difficult (Medda, 2012, p.159). In addition, tax-based LVC policies are unpopular amongst 
politicians, since LVC is perceived as an additional tax (Radzimski 2012). Additionally, the 
partial recuperation of increased land values though tax-based LVC can potentially exacerbate 
development outside of built-up areas resulting in sprawl. Residents living near transit 
investments may be unable to afford the levy or tax that accompanies new infrastructure, 
resulting in the displacement of citizens to areas outside of the tax zone (Jaramillo, 2000). A 
similar theory holds true for developers where developments are relocated outside of the tax 
zone, as a means of cost saving.  
2.Research Design and Methodology  
The following projects were analyzed: Crossrail in London, United Kingdom; No. 7 Line 
Subway Extension & the Hudson Yards Development in New York, New York; and SmartTrack 
in Toronto, Ontario. Due to each project undertaking a different land value capture approach (i.e. 
tax-based, development-based, hybrid, or none) a comparative research approach provides an 
opportunity to analyze the effectiveness of different value capture methods. Each city example 
met the criteria of having a major transit infrastructure project that used a form of land value 
capture to finance a portion of the project or repay project debt. The research question guiding 
my paper seeks to determine the effectiveness of land value capture (LVC) at capturing revenue 
and encouraging development surrounding an infrastructure project. The following criteria was 
used to examine the effectiveness of land value capture:  
1) Land Value Capture’s ability to recuperate funding for project debt repayment; 
• Total revenue collected per annum via land value capture mechanism; and 
• Length of debt repayment process.  
2) Effectiveness of facilitating new development surrounding a station stop:  
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• Examining on-site development features; type, size, unit quantity and pricing.  
Research was conducted through mixed-method approach of secondary data to review  
transit-infrastructure projects that were partially or fully funded through land value capture 
mechanisms. The analysis and collation of quantitative data serves to identify the effectiveness 
of LVC with respect to achieving the financial and development criteria listed above. The 
quantitative financial data was retrieved through secondary research, and publicly available 
government documents for each specific infrastructure project, such as; annual government 
budget reports, government investment and indenture reports, schedules of debt and private 
sector audits. These reports provided key fiscal data for each year an LVC policy was in effect, 
the data was compiled and input onto an excel sheet, to perform basic, yet necessary 
calculations; such the annual and cumulative (to date) revenue per LVC method, debt 
accumulated on borrowed funding, and the length of debt repayment for each project. These 
calculations allowed me to evaluate the fiscal performance of different LVC methods in different 
cities against the criteria listed above.  
 Locating and evaluating the amount of redevelopment surrounding a station stop was 
done through the review of private sector development proposals, municipal planning 
documents, public-private partnership agreements, and advertisements for purchasing/rental 
information made available by land developers. Each city example took a different approach in 
regard to encouraging over-site development around a transit stop. In London, development 
came both privately and through public-private partnerships over a number of subway stations 
throughout London. The City of New York provided private developers, Oxford and Related 
Companies, an opportunity to purchase development rights throughout the Hudson Yards. The 
on-site development information is qualitative in nature and the analysis of secondary data 
showcased each development’s type of use (residential, commercial, etc.), gross floor area, 
amenity space and other information relative to over-site development.  
When I first began researching LVC cases for this paper I thought that the quantitative 
criteria listed above would provide a good indication of the effectiveness of capture mechanisms. 
Through my research, I uncovered that legislative frameworks are crucial for ensuring that land 
value capture mechanisms can be implemented and that private developers contribute to a 
project’s cost. The three city cases exemplify how LVC legislation can assist in the success of a 
value capture scheme, whereas a lack of legislation can severely mitigate LVC enforceability. 
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First-person interviews were conducted with academics and provincial policy directors and 
advisors, to investigate why the Ontario provincial government never implemented regulations 
for the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006). Past provincial employees that worked on the Tax 
Increment Financing Act (2006) were unwilling to formally discuss the legislation, exacerbating 
the difficulty of uncovering any underlying political issues and influences that may have 
prevented the implementation of regulations. My first-person interviews uncovered two possible 
explanations as to why regulations were not implemented.  I do acknowledge that unveiling the 
interests that sought to keep the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006) without regulations is an 
integral area for further research, however, it is beyond the scope of this study.  
3.The Elizabeth Line - London, UK 
Elizabeth Line Project Scope  
 
In 1943, the County of London Plan was created by Patrick Abercrombie, a professor of 
planning at the University of London. The County Plan proposed solutions to London’s growth, 
housing condition, employment problems, traffic and general city development (Jackson & 
Croome,1962).  In 1946, a railway plan was published by the Railway Committee/London Plan, 
proposing the undergrounding of rail lines, removal of railway bridges over the Thames and new 
subway lines providing greater connection to central London (Fergusson, 2001). The London 
Plan Working Party (1949) recommended the construction of the Victoria Line and Jubilee Line 
(Fergusson, 2001), although the Victoria Line was never constructed it would later be revisited in 
the Central London Rail Study, published in 1989 by the Department of Transport (Glaister & 
Travers, 2001). The study proposed a new underground subway connecting central London to 
the eastern and western neighborhoods. A private members bill outlining the scope of Crossrail 
was introduced to the United Kingdom Parliament in 1991 and was subsequently rejected in 
1994 due to the bill not satisfying the committee (Select Committee on the Crossrail Bill, 2008).  
 In February 2005, the Crossrail Hybrid Bill was introduced to London’s Parliament, and 
subsequently considered by the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The purpose of a 
hybrid bill was to grant Transport for London (TfL) authorization to begin preliminary design 
and engineering on the Elizabeth line. According to the City of London Corporation (2015), the 
Elizabeth line will, “make it easier for City businesses to move around London, as well as 
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increasing the number of people who are able to access employment destinations throughout 
London.” (p.4). The Elizabeth Line is currently Europe’s largest infrastructure project (Crossrail, 
2018), and upon completion will be fully integrated with Transport for London’s existing rail 
system. The project is spearheaded by Crossrail Limited, a subsidiary of Transport for London 
(TfL) and jointly sponsored by the Department for Transport (Crossrail, 2018). By late 2018 the 
tunneled portion of the railway in central London was to be in operation, with total project 
completion expected by 2019.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Elizabeth Line Map (Crossrail, 2018) 
 According to the City of London Corporation (2015), the scope of the Elizabeth line is to 
enhance connectivity and efficiency throughout London. There will be over 100 km of new 
railway introduced, of which, 42 km will be excavated for tunneling (Crossrail, 2013). The 
project will span from Reading Station in the North West and Heathrow Airport in the South 
West, across the Greater London Area to Shenfield Station in the North East and Abbey Wood in 
the South East (Figure 1). Crossrail (2018) estimates that over 200 million annual passengers 
will board and travel along the Elizabeth Line annually.  Improved ridership is accomplished by 
enhancing connectivity to different municipalities through the introduction of 41 station stops. 
Ten of the 41 new stations like; Paddington, Bond Street, Tottenham Court Road, Farringdon, 
Liverpool Street, Whitechapel, Canary Wharf, Custom House, Woolwich and Abbey Wood will 
be entirely new stations, featuring over-site development (Crossrail, 2018). A project with such 
an ambitious scope comes with a big price tag, the GLA (2010) estimates the total cost of 
Crossrail to be £15.9 billion.  
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Local Market Analysis and Projections 
 
 Transport for London (TfL), Future of London (FoL) and Crossrail Ltd. have retained a 
number of private consulting firms, such as; KPMG, GVA, JLL, Knight Frank, ARUP and 
Hampton’s International to project the impact of the Elizabeth Line on residential and 
commercial property values. Despite differing approaches of analysis, all the studies predict 
improved property values in proximity to the Crossrail/Elizabeth line station stops. Table 1 
highlights the major findings of the four different consultancy reports. CBRE found that 
dwellings prices near Crossrail Stations will see an annual increase of 2.5%, and properties in 
Central London are set to experience an increase of 20%. The report by JLL, Crossrail: The 
Impact on London’s Property Market indicates that residential rental values will increase from 
2014-2020, whereas Whitechapel, Woolwich, Ealing Broadway and West Drayton stations will 
experience new developments. Hamptons International research insightfully indicates that the 
quantity of sales and new development attributable to Elizabeth Line is continuously increasing, 
whereas Knight Frank research points towards the trend that properties within a 10-minute walk 
of Crossrail in Central London have increased in value.  
 
Table 1 - Property Market Performance Surrounding Crossrail Stations 
Consultancy 
Firm 
Publication  
Title 
Year  
of  
Publication 
Generalized Finding/Projection 
CBRE Crossrail: The Impact 
on London’s Property 
Market 
2016 
 
 
-House prices will increase on average 
2.5% per year around Crossrail 
Stations.  
-Total increase of 13% over and above 
capital appreciation by the time 
Crossrail is fully operational. 
-Central London property values will 
see an overall increase around 20%.  
JLL Crossrail: Identifying 
Opportunities 
January, 
2015 
-Crossrail residential rental value 
growth outperformance 2014-2020: 
Maximum 15%, Average 7%. 
-Stations expecting largest 
development: Whitechapel, 
Woolwich, Ealing Broadway, West 
Drayton. 
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Hamptons 
International 
Linking Housing 
Markets: The effect of 
Crossrail on housing 
markets in London 
March, 
2014 
-Housing sales within a mile of 
Crossrail stations grew by 21%, sales 
within 500 metres grew by 23%. 
-House prices within one mile rose by 
34% from 2009, whereas prices within 
500m rose 27%. 
-Since 2009 2 out of 5 new build sales 
were within a mile of a Crossrail 
station. 
Knight Frank Crossrail – Analysing 
property market 
performance along the 
Elizabeth line 
2017 -From Q3 2014 to Q4 2016, properties 
within a 10-minute walk from 
Crossrail stations in central London 
rose by 6% while Knight Frank’s 
prime central London index dipped by 
5.7%.  
Sources: CBRE. (2016). Crossrail: The Impact on London’s Property Market, 2-3.  
Jll. (2015). Crossrail: Identifying Opportunities, 1-4.  
Hamptons International. (2014). Linking Housing Markets: The effects of Crossrail on housing Markets in London, 4-5.  
Knight Frank LLP. (2017). Crossrail Analysing Property Market Performance Along the Elizabeth Line, 2-6.  
 
In collaboration with Crossrail Ltd. (2018), real estate firm GVA projected the quantity of 
residential developments to be constructed within 1km of Crossrail stations from 2012-2026 
(Table 2). Based on GVA’s findings the Elizabeth line will have a positive impact on the 
quantity and value of properties along the Elizabeth line, GVA (2012) states, “[Crossrail] is 
likely to support the existing strength of the market and enable growth trends to be maintained in 
the future.” (P.59). Such is not a new finding, Cervero (1994) states, “Residential development 
remains the one real estate bright spot…there may be opportunities and pressures for high-
density residential development within walking distance of transit stations.” (p.92).  The influx 
of new residential development and improved land values along the Elizabeth line is primarily 
due to the locational advantage provided through transit infrastructure, as people are willing to 
pay a premium for improved connectivity (Alonso, 1964).  
 
Table 2 - Impact within 1km of an Elizabeth Line Station (GVA & Crossrail, 2018) 
Impact Indicator 2012 2021 2026 
Housing 
Development 
Development of 
57,000 new homes 
Development of 
90,599 new homes 
Development of 
180,000 new homes 
Property Value Uplift £5.5bn in additional 
value 
£10.6bn in property 
values 
£20.1bn total uplift in 
property values 
within 1km of a 
station 
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Commercial 
Development 
3.25mn square metres 
of commercial space 
4.44mn square metres 
of commercial space 
N/A 
Important to note is that development patterns will not be uniform throughout the entirety 
of the Crossrail line. GVA & Crossrail (2018) point out that central areas of the line will 
outperform the eastern and western sections, until the line is fully operable. The built form of 
Central London is substantially different than peripheral eastern and western cities, resulting in 
increased development, “The City of London in particular represent substantial concentrations of 
office-based activity and employment in financial and business services, corporate occupiers and 
government occupiers.” (GVA & Crossrail, 2012, p.58). GVA forecasts the central activity zone 
which serve the United Kingdom’s international business activities (Mid Town, West End, The 
City of London, City Fringe and Canary Wharf), to demand the highest rental levels and values.   
 
Figure 2 - Average Achieved Rents for Residences at Central Crossrail Stations (GVA & Crossrail, 2012) 
In comparison, areas outside of the central area zone will experience lower office 
floorspace demand and generally lower rental and sale values (p.58). GVA and Crossrail LTD 
(2012) forecast that Bond Street will be the only station to outpace the central section average. 
Station areas such as Paddington, Tottenham Court Road and Farringdon will all see relative 
  
20 
improvements (Figure 2), partially due to the availability of large labour pools and enhanced 
direct international business relations. 
Office space development is marginal in the west end of the Elizabeth line, property 
value projections display little to no change in the value of over and under-performing stations in 
the area. The east-end could potentially benefit by being the next-best option outside of central 
London, “the appeal of the closest locations to Central London that could offer a new 
commercial office price category could be significant. The provision of Crossrail services is 
therefore potentially very significant.” (GVA & Crossrail ltd., 2012). Analysts predict that the 
peripheral office market of the Elizabeth line east and west, will begin to see drastic changes in 
property values beginning in 2020. Since 2008, Crossrail has had a substantial affect by 
encouraging development along the Elizabeth Line. According to GVA (2012) from 2013-2016 
nearly 58% of planning rationales cited Crossrail as an influence for development, totalling an 
estimated 3.1 million m2 of office floor space and 220, 000 m2 of new shops and restaurants. By 
the year 2026, the total commercial value uplift attributed to Crossrail is an estimated £215 
million, whereas residential uplift is estimated at £13 billion (GVA, 2012, p.8). The key 
takeaway for office performance on the Elizabeth line appears to be that Crossrail will strengthen 
existing well-performing office markets. Whereas, the east and west stations currently 
performing below benchmark levels will experience value uplift in the future as new office and 
residential spaces are constructed.  
The Legislature 
 
 The Department for Transport (DfT) and Transport for London (TfL) committed to a 
total funding envelope of £15.9 billion for the delivery of the Elizabeth line extension (Crossrail 
ltd., 2018). The Business Rate Supplement Act (2009) was passed by both the House of 
Commons and House of Lords, receiving Royal Assent on July 2nd, 2009, officially becoming an 
act of Parliament (United Kingdom Parliament, 2009). The Business Rate Supplement Act 
(2009) was implemented to provide local authorities and the Greater London Authority, “power 
to impose a levy, to be called a “business rate supplement” (referred to in this Act as a “BRS”), 
on non-domestic ratepayers in its area.” (Business Rate Supplement Act 2009, S.1(1)).  
According to the BRS Act, the levying authority is defined as, “The Greater London Authority, a 
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county council in England, a district council for an area in England for which there is no county 
council and a county council or county borough in Wales.” (Business Rate Supplement Act 
2009, S.2 (1)). Section 1 of the Business Rate Supplement Act (2009) stipulates that the BRS is 
used solely to raise money for projects which are proven to promote economic development. In 
addition, authorities which collect BRS revenue can only expend the money on “the project to 
which the BRS relates, and that the authority would not have incurred had it not imposed the 
BRS.” (Business Rate Supplement Act 2009, S.3 (1)). Certain administrative conditions with 
respect to community consultation and initial documentation must be met prior to imposing a 
BRS, which include the following;    
(a) it has published a document that sets out the proposal for the imposition of the BRS 
(an “initial prospectus”), 
(b) it has consulted the relevant persons on the proposal, 
(c) [a ballot] has been held and the imposition of the BRS approved, and 
(d) it has published a document that sets out the arrangements for the imposition of the 
BRS (a “final prospectus”). (Business Rate Supplement Act 2009, S.4)  
The final prospectus provides in-depth explanations as to how a BRS will be 
implemented throughout the Greater London Area by outlining intricate details, like: project 
capital costs, project financing arrangements, BRS multiplier rates, and debt repayment 
timelines. Section 4 of the BRS Act introduces the additionality test and mayoral ballot, which 
are requirements prior to the imposition of the BRS. The additionality test is outlined in section 
3(1) of the BRS, which specifies that an additionality test will commence to ensure BRS 
revenues are only used on the project to which BRS was intended for and costs the authority 
incurred due to an identified project. Section 7 (1) requires a mayoral ballot to be held if the 
Crossrail BRS will contribute to more than 1/3 of the project cost, and that the ballot is to be held 
prior to the implementation of a BRS. The additionality and ballot test are a safety valve to 
ensure overall support and financial viability prior to project commencement. The Mayor of 
London exempted the project from additionality and ballot testing, using Section 27(6) of the 
BRS Act which states, “Sections 3(1)(b), 7(1) and 10(7) do not apply to a BRS that the Greater 
London Authority proposes to impose, or imposes, in reliance on subsection (2) if the chargeable 
period of the BRS begins on or before 1 April 2011.” (Greater London Authority, 2010, p.47). 
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The GLA’s analysis of Crossrail BRS determined that the supplement would fund less than one 
third of the total project cost. In addition, the project commenced prior to April 1, 2011 deadline, 
meaning neither the test nor ballot were required.  
 Since the levying authority is responsible for prescribing a rateable value condition for a 
hereditament, the legislation requires the levying authority to consult with persons liable to pay 
into the BRS. Legislation which encourages public consultation should be commended, Richard 
Smith (1973) argues that participatory planning processes contribute to adaptive and stable 
societal systems, while citizen participants allows the planning process to become a learning 
system (p.275). Public consultation can potentially play an important role throughout the 
Crossrail project, especially during BRS “revaluation years”. During revaluation years, the GLA 
is able to readjust the BRS rateable value thresholds and multiplier rate, which can alter the 
quantity of ratepayers susceptible to the BRS fee. Section 14 (6) of the Business Rate 
Supplement Act states that the BRS multiplier rate for a financial year cannot exceed 0.02.  If the 
BRS thresholds and rates were to become unaffordable for citizens, public consultation will 
become a powerful tool to voice concern and highlight necessary changes to the BRS.  
The Business Rate Supplement 
On, April 1st, 2010 the Greater London Authority (GLA) implemented a business rate 
supplement (BRS) to finance £4.1 billion of the costs of the £14.8 billion funding envelope for 
the Elizabeth line extension (Crossrail, 2018). The Business Rate Supplement Act enables 
levying authorities to levy a betterment tax on non-domestic properties based on a rateable value 
set by the Greater London Authority. The BRS is collected throughout all 32 London boroughs 
and the Corporation of London. The final prospectus outlines that the first five years of the BRS 
(2010/2011-2014/2015) the levy will be set at 2 pence per pound on non-domestic properties that 
have a rateable value above £55, 000. (Greater London Authority, 2010). For example, a non-
domestic property with a rateable value of £100,000 would be subject to a BRS contribution of 
£2,000 each year until the rateable value is changed or the BRS program is complete. The GLA 
strategically choose a rateable threshold of £55,000, exempting 82% of non-domestic 
hereditaments from the BRS (Greater London Authority, 2010, p. 31), a way of ‘easing’ into the 
BRS. As mentioned earlier, there is a legislated requirement to periodically revaluate rateable 
values and thresholds to adjust for market fluctuations and rate changes. The rateable values are 
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determined by the Valuation Office Agency (VAO), an agency of her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs. The first revaluation came into effect on April 1, 2017, increasing the rateable value 
from £55,000 to £70, 000, and the BRS multiplier is to remain the at 0.02 per pound (Crossrail, 
2017). The new rateable value threshold exempted roughly 85% of non-domestic properties in 
London from the BRS in 2018-2019 (Crossrail, 2017).  
As outlined in the Business Rate Supplement Act (2009), the Greater London Authority 
(GLA) was required to publish a final prospectus outlining how BRS revenues would be raised, 
and the conditions for their use. In January, 2010 the GLA published “Intention to levy a 
business rate supplement to finance the Greater London Authority’s contribution to the Crossrail 
project, Final Prospectus”. According to the final prospectus the Mayor of London, Transport for 
London (TfL) and the Greater London Authority (GLA) will contribute a cumulative funding 
sum of £7.1 billion. Project funding is broken down as follows: £1.9 billion contribution from 
TFL, £4.1 billion from the BRS, £600 million from the community infrastructure levies and an 
estimated £500 million from over-site development (Crossrail, 2018). As outlined by real-estate 
forecasts in the earlier section, the Elizabeth Line will augment property values, the BRS collects 
the betterment of land values. To define betterment in the Crossrail case, I apply Rachelle 
Alterman (2012) definition: “value rise is due to a specific government decision is directly 
caused by specific types of land-use regulatory decisions or by the execution of public 
infrastructure.” (p.9). Through the augmented land values resulting from the Elizabeth Line, the 
BRS will pay off the £4.1 billion of borrowed funding, not the entire Crossrail project cost.   
Business Rate Supplement Performance 
This research uses the following quantitative criteria to evaluate LVC mechanisms; total 
revenue collected per annum, and length of debt repayment. Table 3 was populated based on 
fiscal information derived from the Mayor of London’s ‘Annual Statement of Accounts’ from 
2010 through 2018. Each year the GLA’s statement of accounts provides a section titled, 
“Business Rate Supplement Revenue Account”, its purpose is to account for income raised from 
the BRS along with expenditures incurred from the project. The Crossrail BRS has performed 
exceptionally well, as of 2018 the total gross revenue attributable to the BRS was £1.83 billion. 
The BRS has provided a steady source of income, based on a non-residential rateable value of 
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£55,000, the BRS has averaged a gross annual income of £222.94 million per year. The largest 
spike in gross annual income occurred following when the non-residential rateable value 
determinant increased from £55,000 to £70, 000. In 2017/2018 the £70,000 rateable value 
increased the gross annual income by £46.3 in comparison to 2016/2017 annual revenue, 
foreshadowing a promising future for BRS annual incomes.  
Table 3 - Value Raised via BRS (Mayor of London. (2010-2018). Annual Statement of Accounts.) 
Calendar 
Year 
Non-
Residential 
Rateable Value  
Determinant 
(Thousands) 
Value 
Multiplier  
(Pence per 
Pound)  
Gross Annual 
Income Raised 
Through BRS 
(Millions) 
Interest 
Payable on 
Borrowed 
Funding 
(Millions) 
Annual Scheduled 
Payment for 
Crossrail 
Construction Cost 
(Millions) 
2010/2011 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 224.0 £ 31.1 £ 998.4 
2011/2012 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 231.7 £ 58.3 £ 871.6 
2012/2013 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 224.8 £ 79.8 £ 819 
2013/2014 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 220.4 £ 107.6 £ 875 
2014/2015 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 218.8 £ 121  £ 530 
2015/2016 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 217.5 £ 117 £ 9  
2016/2017 £ 55, 000 2p/£ £ 223.4 £ 116.4 Payment Complete 
2017/2018 £ 70, 000 2p/£ £ 272.8 £ 115.4 Payment Complete 
Total  
 
  £1,833.4 £747.6 £4,103 
The Final Prospectus states the GLA would borrow £3.5 billion at an interest rate of 6%, 
coupled with a direct contribution of £600 million. After the Final Prospectus was published, the 
GLA was able to borrow £3.3 billion at a reduced interest rate of 3.6%. A reduction in borrowed 
principle required the GLA to increase their direct contribution to $800 million. A reduction in 
interest rates plays in important role in mitigating the already high costs of debt servicing. In 
2010/11 the GLA spent £31.1 million on debt servicing, whereas payments escalated to £115.4 
in 2017/2018. To date a total sum of £747.6 million has been paid towards servicing the interest 
on the borrowed funds, however, the GLA has not made any repayments towards the principle 
sum of £3.3 billion. According to the Final Prospectus (2010), repayment on the principle is set 
to begin in 2018/2019, repayments should be completed within 24-31 years.   
 Although it does not account for a substantial portion of Crossrail funding, the 
community infrastructure levy (CIL) will provide £300 million for project funding from the 
private sector. The power to implement a CIL is provided to the mayor under the Planning Act 
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2008, a tool to collect money for infrastructure development. On February 29, 2012 the Mayor of 
London stated the CIL is to be applied to developments consented on or after April 1, 2012 and 
will be collected by London Boroughs upon the beginning of development. The boroughs of 
London are divided into three different zones, each zone requiring a different levy per square 
metre on a development. Premium zones like the City of London charges £50 per square metre, 
whereas zone 2 boroughs like Barnet, levy £35 per square metre and zone 3 boroughs such as 
Enfield charge £20 per square metre. (Greater London Authority, 2018). The CIL program 
accumulated an income of £109.2 million in 2017/18, albeit a slower year than 2016/17 which 
produced £146.7 million. As the Crossrail comes to completion, more development is expected 
to occur throughout all three zones, increasing total CIL contributions.  
Over-Station Developments along the Elizabeth Line  
Public-Private partnerships and developer contributions have been an effective means of 
raising capital while simultaneously encouraging development along the line. The Crossrail Act 
(2008) outlines over-site development (OSD) initiatives as; secure planning consents for OSD 
within two years of the beginning of Crossrail construction, and implement reasonable 
endeavours to ensure construction is completed. It is projected that OSD will generate over £500 
million through OSD agreements (Lindsay, 2018) (Table 4).   
Table 4 - Major Development Partnerships Near Crossrail Stations (Crossrail. (2013). Driving London Development) 
Station Name Development 
Name  
Developer Type # of 
Storeys 
GFA (non-
residential) 
Residential # 
of Units  
Status 
Paddington 
Station 
Paddington 
Triangle 
Not Available Office Space 15 320,000 ft 2 Not 
Applicable 
Proposed 
Canary Wharf Canary Wharf 
Station 
Canary Wharf 
Group 
Retail, 
Public 
Garden 
4 97,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Completed  
Bond Street 
West Station 
65 Davies Street Crossrail & 
Grosvenor   
Office Space   6 115,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Planning 
Granted 
Bond Street 
East Station 
18-19 Hanover 
Street 
Crossrail & 
Great Portland 
Estates (GPE)  
Office, 
Retail, 
Residential 
7 Office:170,40
0 ft2  
Retail/Restaur
ant: 40,900 ft2 
6 Residential 
Units 12,300 
ft2 
Planning 
Granted 
Tottenham 
Court Road 
West 
Dean Street 
Development 
Crossrail as 
acting 
developer 
Retail, 
Residential 
N/A Retail: 12,000 
ft2 
92 Residential 
Units 105,000 
ft2 
Under 
Construction 
Tottenham 
Court Road 
East 
1 Oxford Street Derwent 
London 
 
Office, 
Retail  
8   Office: 209, 
000 ft2  
Not 
Applicable 
Planning 
Granted 
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Retail: 36,000 
ft2 
Theatre: 40, 
000 ft2 
Fisher Street Fisher Street Crossrail/TfL  Residential 8 Not 
Applicable 
22 Residential 
Units 25,00 ft2 
Under 
Construction 
Farringdon 
West 
Cardinal House Cardinal 
Lysander 
Commercial 
Office 
7 138,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Under 
Construction 
Farringdon 
East 
Lindsey Street Crossrail/TfL Office 5 120,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Proposal 
Liverpool 
Street West 
101 Moorgate Aviva Office 6 88,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Planning 
Consent 
Granted 
Liverpool 
Street East 
1-14 Liverpool 
Street 
Aviva Office, 
Ground 
Level retail 
9 256,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Application 
Pending  
100 Liverpool 
Street 
100 Liverpool 
Street 
British Land   Office, 
Retail 
9 515,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Under 
Construction 
Whitechapel Whitechapel 
Central 
L&Q Residential, 
Commercial 
4-25 62,667 ft2 564 Units (149 
Affordable)  
Planning 
Consent 
Granted 
Woolwich  Berkeley Homes Berkeley 
Homes 
Residential 8-23 490,000 ft2 5 Buildings - 
394 Units (58 
Affordable)  
Planning 
Consent 
Granted 
 
Commercial development agreements were put in place at: 
•  Bond Street Station (both entrances);  
• Tottenham Court Road (East ticket hall);  
• Farringdon (West ticket hall); and  
• Liverpool Street (West ticket hall) (Crossrail, 2013).  
Ian Lindsay (2018) on behalf of Crossrail, published a report titled, Crossrail OSD 
Collaboration & Property Value Capture, outlining how OSD development agreements 
functioned. The following excerpt outlines the purchasing, planning, development and sale of 
land through OSD agreements:  
The Railway Promoter agrees to purchase the land in line with the ‘compulsory purchase 
compensation code’; The Landowner/promoter agree to jointly progress the OSD design 
so as to secure a planning consent in joint names; The Landowner/Developer’s design, 
planning, construction interface and other costs are covered by a consideration of the 
lower of 7.5% of total development costs or £6m. The Landowner has pre-emption right 
to buy back the development site at its enhanced market value and on a 125-year lease in 
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return for a 17.5% developer’s priority return on costs with super-profit then shared 
equally (p.1)  
 
The OSD program integrative nature was excellent in enhancing collaboration during the design 
and planning of developments. However, once a planning approval was given, Crossrail and the 
developer no longer shared the risk/reward for a development. This was caused by the 
development agreement shifting significant financial risk onto the developer, in exchange for 
land value only payments (Lindsay, 2018).  Some developers choose to circumvent the OSD 
program, opting for a privatized development approach where all costs and risks are placed 
directly on the private sector.   
Canary Wharf and Woolwich stations were constructed by the Canary Wharf Group and 
Berkeley Homes, respectively. Rather than pursuing their developments through an OSD 
development agreement, the developers took on additional risk by pursuing their development 
privately. Canary Wharf Group and Berkeley Homes developed their projects at their own cost, 
and then secured Crossrail access, integrating their new development directly to the Elizabeth 
line. On May 1st 2015, the Canary Wharf Group officially opened 97,000 ft2 of retail space, 
along with a public garden. The developer was able to produce a fully functional OSD space 
three years prior to the opening of Canary Wharf subway station. Woolwich station was 
originally omitted from the Crossrail plan, after substantial citizen lobbying the station was 
reintroduced to the Crossrail scope. Station design for Woolwich was proving to become 
exceptionally expensive, in an effort to provide connectivity to their proposed development, 
Berkeley Homes offered to fund the construction costs of a station box. The Berkeley proposal 
was accepted by the government, requiring a contribution of land to facilitate the construction of 
a cut and cover station box. To assist in gathering revenues for the cost of the station box and 
expropriated land, local council permitted the developer to intensify the development above 
Woolwich station, resulting in a gross floor area of 490, 000 ft2, amongst five buildings for a 
total of 394 units, 58 of which are classified as affordable. According to Lindsay Ian (2018) the 
Canary Wharf and Berkeley Homes projects are projected to provide an additional £300 million 
for Crossrail.  
The OSD initiative at Crossrail station stops has provided upwards of £500 worth of 
funding for the Crossrail project. In addition, OSD’s have assisted in making use of once idle 
land, creating approximately 3.5 million ft2 of office, retail and residential space, which is 
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projected to increase by 2021. Residential properties have also been positively impacted, the 
GVA (2018) projects that by 2021 Crossrail will generate approximately £10.6 billion to 
property values, along with roughly 90,000 new residences.  Projections for 2026 indicate that 
residential property values will increase near £20 billion in value, along with the construction of 
180,000 new residences (GVA 2018). The TfL played a remarkable role in ensuring that 
Crossrail OSD were located, designed and constructed to enhance integration with stations stops. 
In doing so, there was a substantial financial risk placed on the TfL. The program indicated that 
if OSD development profits were less than the cost of setting-up the OSD program, then TfL 
would be required to pay the difference. Development attributable to the Crossrail OSD program 
and the revenue generated for Crossrail costs appear to be growing at a strong rate, and to date 
TfL has not had to offset any shortfalls in program costs.     
4. Number 7 Line Subway 
Extension/Hudson Yards - New York, New 
York  
Project Scope 
 
 The Line 7 New York City Flushing subway line extension is a 1.5-mile rail expansion 
spanning the previous terminus Times Square, to a new station stop at 34th Street and Eleventh 
Avenue, known as the Hudson Yards (Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 2015). Expanding 
the Line 7 subway dates back to 1969, conceptualized by the Lindsay administration whom 
sought a subway extension would assist in encouraging the redevelopment of the far west side of 
Manhattan (Fisher, 2015). The Lindsay administration proposed funding the line 7 extension via 
state backed bonds, which would be financed through tax revenue on new developments along 
the line, the plan was ultimately cancelled due to voters rejecting a $ 2.5 billion state bond issue 
(Witkin, 1971). Although the plan was cancelled, the idea of self-financing an infrastructure 
project through the sale of state-issued bonds would be revisited in the years to come.  
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Figure 3 - Line 7 Extension (MTA, 2018) 
 The Line 7 expansion was once again reintroduced in 2005, coupled with a proposal for 
an Olympic stadium, both of which were considered integral pieces of infrastructure to secure 
the 2012 Summer Olympic games. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg viewed the Olympic stadium 
as a regenerative tool to redevelop the industrial lands on the west side of Manhattan, Bloomberg 
argued, “Without it, we won't have the catalyst for the growth of this neighborhood, and we'll 
have to revise our plans to make up for it.” (Bagli & Cooper, 2005). The Bloomberg 
administration’s 2002 report title, “Preferred Direction” introduced an agenda to redevelop the 
Hudson Yards to allow for office, residential and commercial spaces. Despite Mayor Bloomberg 
eagerness to build the stadium, the funding initiative was out of New York City’s hands, rather it 
would be decided by the state. Albany Assembly leader Sheldon Silver, Governor George E. 
Pataki and Senate majority leader Joseph L. Bruno refused to support the $2.2 billion stadium 
project, arguing the project would deprioritize the rebuilding of lower Manhattan following the 
events of September 11th 2001.  
Although the Olympic stadium was never funded, the government of New York devised a 
new plan that would regenerate Manhattan’s west side, official known as; No. 7 Extension – 
Hudson Yards Rezoning and Development Program. The document presented an initiative to 
rezone the general area of; West 43rd Street on the North, Hudson River Park on the west, West 
28th and West 30th to the south and Seventh and Eighth Avenues to the east (New York 
Department for City Planning, 2003). The 2003 rezoning plan for the Hudson Yards initially 
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allowed 28 million ft2 of commercial space, approximately 12,600 residential units, and the 
extension of the No.7 Subway Line from its previous terminus of Times Square to a new 
terminus at Eleventh Avenue and West 34th street. (New York Department for City Planning, 
p.1, 2003). The New York City Planning Department and the MTA emphasized that the 
revitalization of the Hudson Yards would not be a success unless the line 7 subway was extended 
to the yards. The New York Planning Department (2003) provided 5 reasons outlining the 
necessity of the Line 7 extension: 
1) Provides the capacity to support the anticipated new demand from residents, visitors, 
and retail and hotel workers.  
2) Closest east-west subway in proximity to the Hudson Yards Area. 
3) Possibility of extending the subway without interfering with other subway lines and 
stations. 
4) Has existing connectivity to major transportation hubs in Manhattan and all of 
Midtown Manhattans north-south subway lines. 
5) Provides direct service between Hudson Yards and Queens.  
(New York City Planning Department, p.6, 2003)  
The transit options for the Hudson Yards at the time would not sufficiently service the proposed 
densities of the fully built out Hudson Yards. From the initial conceptualization of the Line 7 
extension, it was stated that the fiscal responsibility of the project would not fall on the MTA or 
the City of New York. The City proposed a unique method to pay for the project, whereas capital 
would be borrowed to finance the construction of the line, portions of the debt would paid off 
through land value capture mechanisms.  
Local Market Analysis 
The developers of the Hudson yards, Oxford Properties Group and the Related 
Companies retained a New York City-based consultancy, Appleseed, to provide an in-depth 
economic impact analysis of the proposed Hudson Yards development. The project is slated to 
be the largest private development in NYC’s history, from 2012 to 2025, upwards of $20 billion 
will be spent on the development and construction of the Hudson Yards (Appleseed, 2016). The 
Appleseed report estimates that direct and indirect project expenditures will total nearly $17.1 
billion (2018 dollars) by the time of project completion. Construction of the Yards will provide 
98, 360 person-years of employment, creating upwards of $10.6 billion in wages and salaries, 
and $25.6 billion in city-wide economic output (p.5). The construction impact associated with 
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the project from 2012 to 2025 will create 3,649 full-time-equivalent (FTE) jobs per annum, of 
which 2,767 jobs will be in construction and 882 will be in related industries (p.5). Cumulative 
salaries and wages paid to those working on the project amounts to $505.1 million each year, 
averaging roughly $138, 000 per FTE job (p.11). As employers take tenancy, the Yards is 
estimated to employ 55,752 people on a FTE basis, cumulatively generating $9.8 billion in 
income, averaging $175,000 per FTE person (2018 dollars) (p.5). The timing of the project was 
also pivotal, shortly after the United States were recovering from the recession, the Yards 
proposal presented an opportunity to generate tremendous job opportunities throughout the City.  
The estimated cumulative economic impact of the Hudson Yards on the City of New 
York is impressive, providing more than $42.1 billion in annual output, approximately 123, 303 
FTE jobs with cumulative earnings totalling more than $15.9 billion (2018 dollars) throughout 
NYC (p.5). The impact on city wide GDP is also a remarkable feat, when fully operable the 
companies located within the yards are set to contribute nearly $18.9 billion (2018 dollars) 
annually towards New York City’s GDP. This amounts to roughly 2.5 % of New York’s 
citywide GDP, approximately $338,130 per worker/annum (p.5). The City of New York will also 
profit through increased tax returns which can be reinvested to various initiatives throughout the 
City. Appleseed (2016) projects taxes paid by residents employed through the construction 
process of the Yards will generate $237 million in tax revenues for the City. When the project is 
completed and full-time employees begin working in Yards, annual tax revenues are expected to 
increase to $477 million (p.5). Considering the Yards began as a blighted industrial rail-yard on 
Manhattan’s west side, the economic impact of the development is vital for the continuous 
growth of New York. First, more than 64% of New York City’s office space are in buildings at 
least 50 years old (Related & Oxford, 2018), the Yards presents an inviting mixed-use 
community for well-paying employers to locate and maintain New York’s competitive markets. 
Moreover, the site will provide more than 5,000 affordable residential units, a much-needed 
option considering the cost of housing in Manhattan.  
The Legislature  
 
The legislative actions necessary to ensure the Hudson Yard project attracted 
development was a multi-step process. First, the Hudson Yard site required a complete rezoning 
to alleviate the site from its previous commercial and light industrial uses (Fisher, 2015, p.14). 
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The rezoning of the yards incentivized private development by allowing for high density 
commercial and residential uses. A rezoning alone was not adequate to kickstart the 
redevelopment of the Hudson Yards. The New York Planning Department (2003) brilliantly 
insisted that the Line 7 Subway Extension is the missing piece of infrastructure that would link 
the far west side to the rest of New York City. The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the State 
of New York did not view the Line 7 extension as a funding priority, both bodies argued that the 
City of New York should be responsible for its entire funding (Fisher, 2015). New York City 
agreed to fund the full cost of the Line 7 extension through different variations of tax-increment 
financing (TIF). The Committee on New York City Affairs (2007) highlighted that the rezoning 
of the Yards coupled with the Line 7 subway extension would spur development and generate 
enough revenue, to self-finance the Line 7 subway extension (p.357). Self-financing the 
extension would be done through the sale of state backed bonds and paid off through a mix of 
land value capture tools throughout the Yards.   
Rezoning the Hudson Yards 
 
From 1960 onwards, there has been little change to the zoning governing the Hudson 
Yard site. Prior to 2005, the area was predominantly low and medium density manufacturing 
with a few pockets of commercial use. According to the City of New York Planning Department, 
the most common zoning designation amongst the yards was major manufacturing designation 
referred to as M1-5, allowing a floor area ration (FAR) of 5.0. Commercial zones C6-2 and C6-4 
with FAR’s of 6.0 and 10.0 respectively were common throughout the site. The site was also 
home to a number of auxiliary transportation uses; Penn Station, Port Authority bus terminal, 
Lincoln Tunnel access roads and 26 acres of MTA rail yard (Fisher, 2015). The permitted FAR’s 
and infrastructure uses mitigated private development and investment at the Hudson Yard Site.  
 On January 19, 2005 the City Council of New York voted to adopt the Hudson Yard 
Rezoning proposal. According to a New York City Planning Commission Report (2005) the 
benefits of the Hudson Yard rezoning would, “facilitate the expansion of Midtown’s central 
business district, expand residential neighborhoods, and regulate development adjacent to new 
parks and open space and connections to a proposed expansion of the Number 7 Subway Line.” 
(p.1). The zoning amendment establishes and amends a number of policy areas, such as; created 
the Special Hudson Yard District, modifies the policies of the Special Garment Center District 
and Special Clinton District and eliminates the Special Jacob K. Javits Center Convention 
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District. The new zoning amendment was designed to create a ‘bowl’ of regulated densities and 
heights on the perimeter of the Hudson yards, to slowly integrate the development with the 
existing built-form. The highest densities are placed along Eleventh Avenue and West 33rd 
Street, strategically located in close proximity to the Line 7 Subway stop and farthest from the 
medium density residential areas of the site (NYC Department of City Planning, 2005).  The 
medium-density areas of the Hudson yards are nestled along Ninth Avenue to the west of the 
site. Relatively higher densities are layered on the west along Tenth Avenue, the south along 
West 34th Street, to the north along West 42nd Street and on the East where the Special Garment 
Center District is located (NY Department of City Planning, 2005, p.9).   
Through the Special Hudson Yards District provisions of the zoning resolution, the New 
York City Department of City Planning implemented a policy that allow for payments in lieu of 
exceeding zoning densities, known as District Improvement Bonuses (DIB). DIB’s provide an 
opportunity for commercial and residential projects to exceed the base maximum floor area ratio 
(FAR) by making a DIB payment to the Hudson Yard District Improvement Fund. The zoning 
resolution originally set the DIB price at $100 per square foot however, each year the New York 
City Department of City Planning is required to make an annual price adjustment. According to 
the NYC Department of City Planning (2019) the 2019 rate for DIB’s is set at $132.51 per 
square foot. In addition, the City has also introduced the sale of Eastern Rail Yard Transferrable 
Development Rights (ERY TDRs), providing developers an opportunity to purchase the legal 
right to construct over-site developments on the Eastern Rail Yards. The process for purchasing 
ERY TDR’s requires development applications to be received and reviewed by the HYDC, and 
undergoing a value appraisal. Developers whom apply to the HYDC to purchase ERY TDR’s, 
are subject to the TDR pricing mechanism of 65% of the final appraised value per square foot. 
The TDR pricing mechanism is reviewed every three years to determine if adjustments are 
required (HYDC, 2013). Allowing developers to exceed zoning requirements in exchange for 
cash is vital for raising additional revenue to pay for the No. 7 Subway extension (HYDC, 2016).  
Tax-Increment Financing Legislation  
 
 Tax-Increment Financing (TIF) is a tax-based form of land value capture, which provides 
local governments an opportunity to generate revenue through increased tax revenue. According 
to the Committee on New York City Affairs (2007), capital projects in New York City receive 
the following government funding allowance; federal government (80%), state government 
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(15%) and the City of New York (5%) (p.356). Since the City of New York agreed to fund the 
full project cost of the No. 7 subway extension, TIF will play a key role in generating project 
funding.  New York State legislated TIF in 1984 by passing the “Municipal Redevelopment 
Law” (Cerciello, 2005, p.104).  The Municipal Redevelopment Law outlines the necessary 
project characteristics to implement TIF and/or PILOT financing. Section 970-B highlights that 
TIF can only be employed to redevelop what are determined to be ‘blighted areas’, defined by 
the New York State Legislature as; lands which have a predominance of buildings that are 
deteriorated and unsafe for occupancy. Blighted lands are generally economically unproductive, 
where the buildings and structures that occupy the lands require redevelopment to mitigate 
further deterioration that could jeopardize the economic well-being of its residents. (Municipal 
Redevelopment Law, 970-B). The City of New York determined the Hudson Yards fit within the 
states description of a ‘blighted’ area. Requiring the project to advance to the ‘Survey Area 
Study’ phase, which assesses the feasibility of redeveloping the subject lands. If the State and 
City of New York deem the project plan to be feasible, a redevelopment plan will be prepared as 
per Section 970-F, outlining the height, size and number of buildings, amount of open space, 
dwelling units available, environmental areas and neighbourhood impact assessments, among 
many other features. (Municipal Redevelopment Law, 970-F). The Municipal Redevelopment 
Law also requires public participation, as per section 970-H which requires a public hearing prior 
to plan adoption. Section 970-H (C) states that any persons whom objects to the proposed 
development plan, the existence of blight, legal boundaries of the plan, or the appropriateness of 
the prior proceedings, may appear at a sanctioned public meeting to advocate why the proposal 
should not be adopted by the legislative body (Municipal Redevelopment Law, 970-H(c)).  
 The legislative mechanism necessary to generate income to fund the No. 7 subway 
extension is found in section 970-O, “Tax Increment Bonds”. A municipality is authorized to 
issue tax increment bonds that are secured and payable through real property taxes, the 
repayment of tax increment bonds through property taxes will not be subordinate to any other 
debts carried by the municipality (Municipal Redevelopment Act, 970-O(a)), providing a sense 
of financial security for bond purchasers. A municipality is not legally entitled to issue bonds for 
any capital project except for the following uses:  
(i) acquisition of land; 
(ii) demolition and removal of buildings, structures and improvements and site 
preparation 
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(iii) installation, construction or reconstruction of streets, walkways, docks, drainage, 
parking facilities, flood control facilities, water and sewer systems and other 
public utilities, parks and playgrounds; 
(iv) other public improvements or services integral to the redevelopment plan 
authorized by or for which a period of probable usefulness has been established 
by section 11.00 of the local finance law. Objects and purposes referred to in this 
subdivision shall be deemed to have the period of probable usefulness as provided 
for such objects and purposes by such section. 
(Municipal Redevelopment Law 970-O (i)) 
 
The New York Industrial Development Agency (NYCIDA) amended the Uniform Tax 
Exemption Policy (UTEP) to provide financial assistance through the payment in lieu of taxes 
(PILOT) program. The Committee on New York City Affairs (2007) outlines that through 
PILOT, there is a required land transfer process amongst the NYCIDA and a property developer.    
Under the land transfer process, NYIDA purchases land from a developer for a token amount, 
effectively removing the land from the City of New York’s property tax roll (p.359). Properties 
contributing PILOT payments must be exempt from real estate taxes for the length of their 
agreed upon timeline. When the payment cycle is complete the IDA returns the land to the 
developer for a token amount, marking the end of the PILOT program and placing the land back 
on the City’s property tax roll. PILOT rates in the Hudson Yards are assessed on the same basis 
as real estate taxes, the length of the Hudson Yard PILOT program is estimated to last 19 years 
(The Committee on New York City Affairs, 2007).  
In 2005, the City of New York created the Hudson Yard Infrastructure Corporation 
(HYIC) through the Senate of New York’s not-for-profit corporation law (HYIC, 2008). The 
HYIC does not directly engage in development of the Hudson Yards, the HYIC purpose is self-
described as, “the HYIC’s operations consist of carrying out the requirements of its indenture, 
including collecting revenues, applying revenues to pay principal and interest on its bonds and 
disbursing bond proceeds to pay project costs.” (p.2).  The issuance of bonds would be paid off 
through the revenue collected by the HYIC throughout the Hudson Yards area via; payments in 
lieu of taxes (PILOT), payment in lieu of mortgage taxes, tax equivalent payments by the City, 
sale of development rights over the Eastern Railyard and density bonusing. 
 
Land Value Capture’s Performance at the Hudson Yards 
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 The HYIC issued the first set of Series A Revenue Bonds (FY07 Bonds) on December 
21, 2006, for an amount of $2 billion. The bonds are set to mature on February 15, 2047, with 
semi-annual interest payments beginning on August 15, 2007 (Hudson Yard Infrastructure 
Corporation, 2016, p.9). An additional $1 billion of Series A Senior Revenue Bonds (FY12 
Bonds) were issued on October 26, 2011 to assist in financing additional project costs. Similar to 
FY07 bonds, the FY12 bonds were term bonds with semi-annual interest payments set to begin 
on February 15, 2012, with a date of full maturity on February 15, 2047 (p.9). A policy clause set 
out in the ‘Second Trust Indenture’ (2017) stated that the HYIC was not obligated to make 
payment on bonds prior to maturity, or until the HYIC had substantial revenue flow to make 
such payments. However, FY07 bonds were paid off earlier than expected when a second 
indenture of Series A Subordinate Bonds were issued on May 30, 2017. The second indenture 
issued $2.1 billion worth of bonds, along with $33.3 million of Series B Subordinate Bonds, 
collectively referred to as FY17 Bonds. The revenue collected from FY17 bonds were applied to 
refund all of the FY07 bonds and $391 million worth of FY12 bonds (p.9). The remaining $609 
million of FY12 bonds were amortized and will be paid off through sinking fund installments 
until 2047 (p.9). Paying off FY07 bonds prior to maturity allowed the HYIC to refinance their 
borrowed capital at a lower borrowing rate, saving millions in future debt financing payments. 
As of June 30th, 2017, the HYIC had roughly $2.75 billion of outstanding bonds (HYIC, 2017), 
which are to be serviced by a mix of revenue sources at the Hudson Yards.  
 The HYIC (2008-2018) Annual Fiscal Report lists the corporation’s main revenue 
sources as; Interest Support Payments (ISP), Payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT), Tax Equivalency 
Payments (TEP), District Improvement Bonuses (DIB), Payments in lieu of mortgage recording 
tax (PILOMRT) and interest earned on unspent bond proceeds (p.23-24). Pertinent to the focus 
of this paper, the following analysis will exclusively focus on LVC specific revenue sources at 
the Hudson Yards, which are: PILOT, DIB and PILOMRT. Moreover, since the HYIC acquired 
a 50% interest stake of Eastern Rail Yard Transferable Development Rights (ERY TDR’s), the 
revenue generated through the sale of TDR’s will also be included. The following tables were 
composed from the Hudson Yard Infrastructure Corporation, Annual Fiscal Report from 2008 to 
2018. The data provides valuable insight on the effectiveness LVC at recuperating revenue for 
project funding and debt financing.  
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As of June 30, 2018, District Improvement Bonuses (DIB) and Eastern Rail Yard 
Transferable Development Rights (ERY TDR) have cumulatively earned $425, 669 million and 
$2, 235 billion, respectively. DIB’s and ERY TDR’s allow private developers to purchase the 
right to construct buildings that exceed the permissible height, size and density as delineated by 
the Hudson Yard’s zoning regulation. The annual fiscal average of DIB is roughly $21 million 
whereas ERY TDR average approximately $203 million. In 2015, the HYIC saw a $183 million 
spike in DIB payments relative to 2014, representing the increased quantity of new developments 
throughout the Yards. ERY TDR’s experienced an increase in 2014 due to the increased cost of 
purchasing TDR’s, the HYIC had pledged to use all revenue and proceeds from the sale of 
TDR’s to secure FY12 and FY17 bonds. In September 2017, the HYIC sold off the remainder of 
the ERY TDR’s, however they are not listed as a revenue tool for the HYIC, rather they are 
explicitly used to service debt.  
 
Table 5 - Hudson Yards LVC Revenue. (HYIC. (2008-2018). Annual Fiscal Report) 
Fiscal Year 
Revenue Source (Value in Thousands) 
DIB PILOMRT PILOT ERY TDR 
2007 57,938 0 0 202,345 
2008 6,930 0 0 208,152 
2009 4,488 0 0 215,505 
2010 0 0 0 224,404 
2011 4,635 0 0 233,681 
2012 2,951 0 0 242,958 
2013 3,261 11,097 0 252,235 
2014 10,827 13,873 0 261,513 
2015 193,652 0 4,036 191,276 
2016 45,183 22,496 4,969 99,367 
2017 20,705 31,384 10,947 104,029 
2018 75,099 17,782 31,710 0 
Total 
(Thousands) 425,669 96,632 51,662 2,235,465 
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In the fiscal year 2014, the HYIC received its first PILOT payment, however the 
assessment was attributable to the following fiscal year, which is why Table 5 lists 2015 as the 
first fiscal year the HYIC received a PILOT payment. As of June 30, 2018, PILOT payments 
have averaged revenues of $12.9 million per fiscal year. PILOT payments have also assisted 
Government funded assets, in 2015 $4.7 million was collected through the application fees 
associated with PILOT payments. Every developer that entered into a PILOT agreement is 
required to enter into a PILOMRT, on average per fiscal year PILOMRT has generated $16.1 
million. For the fiscal year 2014-2015 the HYIC did not collect any revenue via PILOMRT, 
which was never formally explained in any HYIC documentation. As of June 30, 2018, PILOT 
and PILOMRT payments did not represent a substantial portion of HYIC revenue.  
The HYIC 2019 Budget provides PILOT revenue projections for the next 4 fiscal years, 
as follows; 2019 at $31.5 million, 2020 at $70.3 million, 2021 at $83.8 million and 2022 at $86.7 
million (p.1). The HYIC expects future PILOT revenues to provide a steady increase as 
developments within the project area are constructed and begin to take occupancy.  
Unfortunately, the HYIC 2019 Budget states, “Annual receipts of DIB, & PILOMRT payments 
has been unpredictable and thus we have not projected such receipts for FY 2019 through FY 
2022. HYIC has been fully repaid for TDRs and thus is not entitled to any further receipts.” 
(p.1). At this time the performance data for PILOT and PILOMRT are inconclusive, future 
analysis is required to determine their future ability to generate revenue for the project. In 
contrast, ERY TDR’s and to some extent BID’s, have performed exceptionally with respect to 
generating profit for the HYIC. Their performance can be tracked back to Adam Smith’s (1776) 
theory that landlords demand a premium for land that received an improvement. As the Hudson 
Yard’s received new infrastructure, like the No.7 subway stop, up-dated zoning uses and a 
general redevelopment of the area, developers sought the land as more valuable. Fisher (2015), 
proposes that property brings more value when it is built to or exceeds maximum height and 
density allowances, which allowed the HYI to generate additional revenue through the sale of 
DIB’s and TDR’s.  
 The HYIC uses three governmental funds for its activities; a General Fund (GF), Debt 
Service Fund (DSF) and a Capital Project Fund (CPF). The DSF is used to pay interest on the 
principal debt, through PILOT, PILOMRT and DIB and TDR’s. Whereas the CPF issues bonds 
and provides funding for project expenditures. The most expensive capital cost for the project 
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was the No. 7 Subway Line extension, representing a cost of $2.29 billion as of June 30, 2018. 
The Subway Extension Memorandum of Understanding amongst the HYIC, City of New York, 
HYDC and MTA states that the HYIC, HYDC and City would provide up to $2.1 billion for the 
No.7 extension. Land acquisition and amenities also represented a substantial project expense, 
accruing a cumulative cost of $713 million from fiscal years 2007 until 2018. The HYIC 
explains that the cost of the subway extension, land acquisition and amenities costs are expected 
to gradually diminish over the lifespan of the project, allowing capital to be allocated to debt 
servicing.   
 
Table 6 - Hudson Yards Project Expenses (HYIC. (2007-2018). Annual Fiscal Report) 
Fiscal Year 
Expenses (Value in Thousands) 
Subway 
Extension 
Land 
Acquisition 
& 
Amenities 
Transfer 
to 
HYDC 
Payment 
to NYC 
TFA 
Fiscal 
Year 
Bond 
Interest 
Accrued 
Bond 
Interest 
Payable 
Total 
Bonds 
Payable 
(Without 
Premium) 
2007 37,553 70,964 6,168 0 46,542 51,458 2,000,000 
2008 248,765 264,458 3,021 0 89,122 36,833 2,000,000 
2009 391,913 43,868 5,214 0 87,576 36,833 2,000,000 
2010 310,280 70,055 2,254 0 86,030 36,833 2,000,000 
2011 275,609 69,269 3,198 0 85,652 36,833 2,000,000 
2012 316,439 39,787 3,026 0 122,623 57,847 3,000,000 
2013 325,414 18,884 1,980 0 140,393 57,847 3,000,000 
2014 175,228 91,136 2,233 0 140,393 57,847 3,000,000 
2015 107,412 9,956 1,343 129,359 129,359 57,847 3,000,000 
2016 38,600 16,335 1,097 0 142,425 57,847 3,000,000 
2017 35,847 14,105 674 112,793 129,526 21,181 2,750,760 
2018 28,602 4,589 2,013 0 115,217 49,961 2,723,870 
Total 
(Thousands) 2,291,662 713,406 32,221 242,152 1,314,858 559,167 2,723,870 
 
As stated earlier, the HYIC issued three different bond indentures; 
1) December 21, 2006 - FY07 bonds totalling $2 billion (Series A);  
2) October 26, 2011 – FY12 Bonds totalling $1 billion (Series A);  
3) May 30, 2017 – FY17 bonds totalling $2.1 billion (Series A) and $33.3 million (Series 
B).  
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Proceeds from the issuance of FY17 bonds were used to refund all of FY07 Bonds and $391 
million of FY12 bonds, requiring the remaining $609 million of FY12 bonds to be serviced by 
2047 through sinking fund installments. The HYIC (2018) outlines that the FY17 bond indenture 
allowed bonds to be financed at a lower rate, and to make payments to the NYC Transitional 
Finance Authority (NYC TFA) to defease a portion of HYIC debt. In December 2017, the HYIC 
allocated $30.3 million of existing resources towards FY12 bonds, defeasing $26.9 million of 
FY12 Series A Bonds. The remainder of outstanding bonds are charged at a premium fixed 
interest rate between 3% to 5.75% (HYIC, 2018). Accrued interest is the interest on a bond that 
has accumulated since the principal investment, in 2017, the HYIC saw the greatest decrease in 
accrued interest payable, due to the issuing of FY17 bonds, which reduced the accrued interest of 
FY07 and FY12 bonds. The HYIC 2018 Annual Fiscal Report outlines the contractual obligation 
for all bonds to be paid off by 2047. The debt servicing plan on bonds, principal costs and 
interest payments outlines the amount spent financing debt and the timeline until bonds are paid 
off. Over the next 28 year the HYIC (2018) estimates debt servicing will cost a total of $5.213 
billion, with approximately $2.723 billion being spent on principal payments and $2.489 billion 
allocated towards interest payments on first and second indenture bonds (Table 7).  
Table 7- Debt Servicing Plan (HYIC. (2018). Annual Fiscal Report) 
 
 
Development within the Hudson Yards 
 
 On May 26th, 2010, a joint venture amongst the Related Companies and Oxford 
Properties Group was announced, marking their role in developing a number of buildings in the 
Hudson Yards. The Related Companies is a privately owned American based real estate firm, 
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whereas Oxford Properties Group functions as a real estate investment and development firm, an 
arm of the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS). According to the MTA 
(2010) the Related Companies received development rights by the MTA in 2008, coupled with a 
binding site lease for 99 years. In May 2010, Related and Oxford entered a contractual 
agreement with the MTA for the development rights to 13 million square feet of space at the 
Hudson Yards. The MTA (2010) highlights that the joint venture will provide ground lease 
payments, coupled with a purchase option worth approximately $1 billion. The Related and 
Oxford partnership played a crucial role in attaining private financing and investment for 
developments at the Yards. The Related Companies and Oxford Properties were able secure $1.4 
billion in equity and debt investments for 10 Hudson Yards in 2013 (Related & Oxford, 2013). In 
November, 2016 the Hudson Yards New York (2016) announced the closing of $1.3 billion in 
investment funding for the condominium development at 15 Hudson Yards. A contributing 
factor that assisted the Related Companies and Oxford efforts to secure funding was largely due 
to government led planning policies. The rezoning of the Hudson Yards, district improvement 
bonuses and transferable development rights incentivized high density development which 
subsequently attracted billions in investments throughout the Hudson Yards (Hudson Yards New 
York, 2018). 
Table 8- Hudson Yard Development (Related Companies & Oxford, 2018) 
Development 
Name  
Developer Development 
Type 
# of 
Storeys 
GFA (non-
residential) 
Residential # 
of Units  
Status 
35 Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Properties 
Group 
Residential, 
Hotel, Retail 
92 22, 000 ft2  of 
Amenities  
200 Hotel 
Rooms 
143 Under 
Construction 
15 Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company 
Residential  88 40, 000 ft2 of 
Amenities 
285   Under 
Construction  
One Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company 
Residential 33 Not 
Applicable 
178 (Rental)  Completed  
Abington 
House 
Related 
Company & 
Abington 
Properties 
Residential 33 Not 
Applicable 
386 (Rental)  Completed 
10 Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Properties 
Group 
Office, 
Commercial, 
Street Retail 
55 1.8 million ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Completed 
30 Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Office, 
Commercial 
73 2.6 million ft2 Not 
Applicable 
 Under 
Construction 
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Properties 
Group 
50 Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Properties 
Group, Mitsui 
Fudosan 
Office, 
Commercial 
58 2.9 million ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Under 
Construction 
55 Hudson 
Yards 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Properties 
Group 
Office, 
Commercial 
40 1.3 million ft2 Not 
Applicable 
 Completed 
The Shops & 
Restaurants at 
Hudson Yards 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Properties 
Group 
Retail, 
Restaurant  
7 1 million ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Completed 
The Shed 
Bloomberg 
Building 
The Shed Entertainment 
(Art & 
Culture) 
6 200, 000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Completed 
Javits 
Convention 
Center 
Empire State 
Development 
Corporation 
Convention 
Center  
4 840,000 ft2 Not 
Applicable 
Completed 
Public Square 
& Gardens 
Related 
Company, 
Oxford 
Properties 
Group 
Parks & Open 
Space 
0 4.5 Acres Not 
Applicable 
Completed 
 
 Upon project completion in 2025, the Related Companies and Oxford (2018) indicate that 
the Hudson Yards will be home to more than 17 million square feet of commercial and office 
space, 4,000 residences, 14-acres of public and open space, over 100 shops and restaurants and a 
public school. The mix of retail, commercial and office tenants, play an important role in 
creating amenity space that draw in business, permanent residents, day-visits and tourism. The 
Shops and Restaurants at Hudson Yards list upwards of 25 cafes and restaurants and 47 retail 
stores.  The shops feature global retail companies, like; Aritzia, Uniqlo, Lululemon, H&M, 
Coach, Neiman Marcus, Brooks Brothers, Dior and Luis Vuitton. The anchor tenants for the 
office space in the Hudson Yards also include a variety of multi-national companies such as, 
Boston Consulting Group, SAP, Side Walk Labs, Wells Fargo, CNN and HBO. Purchasing and 
leasing information provided by the Hudson Yards New York (2019) showcase the amount of 
office and retail floorspace purchased by various companies; Time Warner 1.5 million ft2, Coach 
700,000 ft2, Wells Fargo 500, 000 ft2, KKR 343,000 ft2, and DNB with 44, 500 ft2. According to 
fourth quarter office leasing reports by, Avison & Young (2018) the Hudson Yards achieved an 
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impressive office leasing vacancy rate of 7.9%, outperforming the World Trade Center and 
Grand Central vacancy rates of 16.9% and 10.7%, respectively (p.5). Low-vacancy rates coupled 
with large office space purchases, showcase the important role the Hudson Yards will play as a 
future employment hub.  
 As of the first quarter of 2019, condominiums developments 15 and 35 Hudson yards 
were nearly completed and ready for occupancy. Residential rental buildings, the Abington 
House and One Hudson Yards, were deemed complete and ready for occupancy. 35 Hudson 
Yards is set to be one of the largest building’s within the Yards, totalling 92 stories, featuring; 
200 hotel rooms, 22,000 ft2 of amenity space and 143 residences with prices upwards of $5 
million (Related, 2019). In comparison, 15 Hudson Yards is 88 stories, featuring 285 residences 
and over 40 ,000 ft2 of amenity space. The Related Companies (2019) website for 35 Hudson 
Yards markets the residences as, “A 92-story limestone tower … Grand two- to six-bedroom 
residences priced from approximately $5 million starting on the 53rd floor, atop the flagship 
Equinox Hotel.” (Related Companies, 2019). The Abington House offers approximately 386 
luxury rental units where monthly rents for a 2-bedroom and 2 bath apartments range from $6, 
940, upwards of $9, 550 (Related, 2019). According to Curbed New York (2018) approximately 
400 units throughout the current phases of development at the Yards are to be ‘affordable’ units. 
A lottery is set to take place for the affordable units amongst New Yorkers earning 50-60% of 
the area median income, affordable rental rates range from $858 a month for a studio up to 
$1,350 a month for a two-bedroom (p.1).  
Despite affordability concerns, the Hudson Yards Development has done a good job of 
providing public and open spaces for the community. The revitalization of the Public Square and 
Garden, introduced a total of 4.5 acres of open space to share amongst residents and the public. 
Other buildings like, ‘The Shed’ created more than 200, 000 ft2 of fine arts and entertainment 
space. The Shed features a state-of-the-art moveable wall and roof structure, allowing the event 
space to expand for additional room. The construction of ‘The Vessel’, a $200 million, 150-foot-
tall structure with over 2,500 steps, was placed in the centre of the Yards, functioning as place-
making architecture.  According to the Hudson Yards New York (2019) upon completion of the 
development in 2025, the Yards will generate roughly $500 million in annual taxes for the City 
of New York, create over 55, 000 jobs and more than 125, 000 people will work, live and visit 
the Yards each day, a substantial improvement from what was once a blighted rail yard.  
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5. Land Value Capture in Toronto  
The Legislature, or Lack thereof 
 
 On December 20th 2006, the Ontario Legislature passed the Tax Increment Financing Act 
(2006), giving Ontario municipalities the power to use tax-increment financing to fund eligible 
projects. Section 1 of the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006) determines the following projects 
to be eligible for TIF; 
(a) the construction of municipal infrastructure or amenities to assist in, 
(i) the redevelopment or intensification of previously developed areas, or 
(ii) the development of an urban growth centre identified in a growth plan under 
the Places to Grow Act, 2005, 
(b) the environmental remediation of land in a previously developed area, or 
(c) the construction of a municipal public transit facility.  
    (Government of Ontario, Section 1, 2006) 
 
Assuming a project meets the TIF criteria as delineated by the Government of Ontario, 
the next steps involve a feasibility study to identify specific project characteristics. Section 2 (2) 
requires the feasibility study to identify the proposed TIF district and the projected amount of 
expected tax increments. Property values can be augmented for a number of reasons, delineating 
the specific factors responsible for land value augmentation and the quantity which they improve 
land values is difficult. A well thought out policy of the legislation is found in, Section 2 (3) 
“Limitation, proposed tax increment finance district” of the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006), 
which limits the total amount of funds raised in a TIF district. Research by Greenbaum and 
Landers (2014) highlight that when TIF districts gain substantial revenue it is often at the 
expense of the municipality. By limiting a TIF district revenue to 1% of a municipalities total tax 
revenue, the legislation safeguards the economic performance of local municipalities.  
The biggest draw for public agencies to implement the Ontario TIF Act (2006), is found in 
Section 2, “a municipality may apply to receive funding for a proposed project from the Crown 
in right of Ontario that is based on the education tax increments expected to occur as a result of 
the project” (Government of Ontario, Section 2, 2006). The education tax increment is defined 
as, “the tax increment in respect of taxes for school purposes or payments in lieu of taxes for 
school purposes” (Government of Ontario, 2006). Giving a public agency access to the education 
tax increment could potentially become one of the largest funding options for eligible projects.  
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The 2006 TIF legislation has never been used to fund a project, due to the fact that 
Ontario’s TIF legislation never received regulations. The Province of Ontario e-law dictionary 
states that after a bill undergoes a third reading and is passed by the Legislative Assembly, it 
receives Royal Assent by the Lieutenant Governor, making it a law. Regulations are created to 
provide a rigid set of rules and details to implement the polices within the statute (Ontario, 
2019). Ontario’s 2006 Provincial Budget announced the Provinces intention to use the Tax 
Increment Financing Act (2006) as a pilot funding mechanism for the Toronto-York Spadina 
Subway Extension (TYSSE) and Toronto Waterfront. On April 6, 2007, the City of Toronto 
provided a report to the executive committee on the status of funding for the TYSSE. One of the 
funding conditions outlined in the report was that, “the Province of Ontario will enact legislation 
that would allow the City to avail itself of tax increment financing as a method of financing its 
share of Project capital costs;” (p.3). The report outlines that the City of Toronto was in the 
process of formulating regulations with the Ministry of Finance.  In 2007 and 2011, the City of 
Toronto prepared a feasibility study as mandated by the 2006 TIF legislation, which forecasted 
the tax increment associated with the TYSSE. Both the Regional Municipality of York and the 
City of Toronto were eager to use TIF to fund a portion of the TYSSE (Found, 2018). The 
Regional Municipality of York published a confidential staff report on April 18th, 2016 titled 
“Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension – Project Reset and Estimated Cost to Completion”. 
The report distressfully states, “Given provincial inaction for almost a decade now, on enabling 
Toronto and York Region to access Tax Increment Financing, the City and York Region have 
now planned for alternate sources of funding” (p.7). It was clear that without regulations the TIF 
legislation was dead in the water.  
In an effort to uncover why no regulations were created, I conducted interviews with a 
variety of municipal tax experts. One interviewee was a former Director of Policy for the 
Minister of Finance, whom worked for previous Finance Ministers; Greg Sorbara (who 
introduced the TIF Act (2006)) and Dwight Duncan. The former Director of Policy perceived 
that TIF never received regulations for two reasons: an unwillingness for the province to share 
revenues from the education tax increment, and a lack of bureaucratic will. With respect to 
sharing revenues, Section 2 (1) of the Tax Increment Financing Act, 2006 outlines the allocation 
of funds from that education tax increment; “A municipality may apply to receive funding for a 
proposed project from the Crown in right of Ontario that is based on the education tax 
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increments expected to occur as a result of the project” (Government of Ontario, Section 2, 
2006). The education tax increment was a decision of the 1998 Mike Harris Provincial 
government, known as ‘local service restructuring’. The province took over local school boards 
taxing power, replacing the local education property tax with a general provincial tax (Found, 
2016). According to Adam Found (2016), “The provincial contribution is effectively a capital 
grant conditional on the fulfillment of projected infrastructure-induced increases in the 
assessment base of the TIF district.” (p.5). By giving municipalities access to the revenues 
acquired through the education tax increment for a specific project, additional capital would 
become available to offset some of the project costs, reducing the financial burden on local, 
provincial and federal governments. 
 I asked the former Policy Director, why they thought the province was reluctant to share 
revenues from the education tax increment with municipalities? Their response was, “I think 
there may have been a reluctance by the ministry [of finance] to give up revenue” (Lofsky, 
personal communication, April 15, 2019), a well-founded argument considering the economic 
performance following the recession. My interviewee outlined that from 2005 until 2007 the 
province of Ontario had a budget surplus, affirmed by the Ministry of Finance (2007), “in 2005–
06 Ontario posted a surplus of $0.3 billion, and the Public Accounts of Ontario confirm a 
$2.3 billion surplus in 2006–07 – the government's second consecutive surplus” (p.1). Shortly 
after the TIF Act (2006) was passed in the legislature, the great recession hit Ontario, fostering a 
reluctance amongst policy makers to give municipalities access to the education tax increment. 
My interviewee stated; “they [the province] were looking for every penny they could find. It was 
around the financial crisis; the province was going deep into deficit at that time. It’s worth noting 
that prior to 2006/2007 there were three years of surplus, there was a little more flexibility in the 
province.” (Lofsky, personal communication, April 15, 2019). Despite a global recession, my 
interviewee acknowledges that allocating the revenue from the education tax increment would be 
a relatively minor cost for the province, “I didn’t think it would be that big of a deal it was 
relatively small loss of money especially in the earlier years [of TIF]” (Lofsky, personal 
communication, April 15, 2019). Since the revenue generated by TIF is relative to the amount 
that land values augment from a public project (Alterman, 2012), there is generally less 
development in a TIF zone during the early project years, resulting in lower TIF revenues. The 
government of Ontario may have overestimated the quantity of funds that would be allocated 
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from the education tax increment toward the Spadina Subway Extension. However, pursuing a 
fiscally conservative approach is understandable during one of Canada’s biggest economic 
downturns.   
Premier Dalton McGuinty appointed Greg Sorbara as the Minister of Finance, who held 
the position from October 23, 2003 to October 11, 2005, and again from May 23, 2006 until 
October 30, 2007 (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2019).  In 2007, shortly after passing the 
TIF legislation, Minister Sorbara resigned from his role as finance Minister. The role was 
subsequently appointed to Dwight Duncan, who served as Finance Minister from October 30, 
2007 until October 20, 2011 (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2019). My interviewee served as 
the Director of Policy for both Finance Ministers. I questioned why regulations were ever drafted 
for the 2006 Tax Increment Financing Act?  He informed me that a possible reason for no 
regulations was due to a change in Ministerial leadership. Greg Sorbara was the front runner of 
the TIF act, introducing the act to the legislature in 2006 as, “a mechanism [TIF] that's been used 
in a variety of jurisdictions across North America … to help fund subway construction and 
waterfront development (Sorbara, December 5, 2006). During our conversation, my interviewee 
stated, “I just don’t think there was a lot of bureaucratic will to do it, once Greg Sorbara left, 
that’s my view” (Lofsky, communication, April 15, 2019). Another interviewee I spoke to 
worked as a consultant who analyzed potential TIF revenue for the City of Toronto, when asked 
why regulations were not drafted they provided a response which mirrored the explanation 
provided by the former policy director. Both interviewees indicated that a ministerial change 
from Greg Sorbara to Dwight Duncan potentially altered the direction of the TIF legislation, as 
Minister Duncan had a less permissive view of using the education tax increment in 
comparison to Minister Sorbara. Both interviewees bring a well-founded perspective based on 
their experience of working with the elected officials at the provincial level. By no means do I 
intend to dismiss the valuable information provided by both interviewees, however, I do not have 
the means to validate the bureaucratic will of Finance Minister Duncan. The only people that can 
truly explain why the TIF Act (2006) never received regulations are Greg Sorbara and Dwight 
Duncan, and perhaps a few others. This is definitely a subject that requires further research to 
uncover underlying political interests and influences.  
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SmartTrack Project Scope  
 
John Tory introduced the SmartTrack rail concept during his 2014 mayoral campaign, 
arguing that the project would reduce vehicular gridlock and provide relief to the Yonge 
University Spadina line. The line would span from the Mississauga in the west end to Etobicoke 
in the east, and eventually terminate at Unionville in Markham. Johnathon Kay (2014) of the 
National Post highlights the new rail line would provide, “15-minute service from Pearson 
airport in the west up into Markham in the northeast - a 7-year, $8-billion, 22-station 
construction project based largely around electrifying existing regional GO lines.” (Kay, 2014). 
Roughly 90% of the SmartTrack line would run on existing Go Transit Tracks, which was a 
well-timed decision given the announcement of the 2014 Provincial Liberal governments to 
electrify GoRail lines to provide all-day, two-way route services. Shortly after taking office as 
Mayor of Toronto, Tory’s SmartTrack plan was amended. Tory’s new plan sought to extend the 
Eglinton West LRT line, which would, “integrate SmartTrack/RER service on the Kitchener and 
Stouffville/Lakeshore East Go corridors with service frequencies of 6-10-minute peak service 
and 15-minute off-peak service at fourteen stations, which includes six new SmartTrack stations” 
(Ernst & Young, 2018, p.1). SmartTrack’s website outlines the location of the six new 
SmartTrack stations as the following: St. Clair-Old Weston, King-Liberty, East Harbour, 
Gerrard-Carlaw, Lawrence-Kennedy and Finch-Kennedy (SmartTrack, 2018). In early April 
2018, City of Toronto Council approved $1.463 billion in funding for the construction of the six 
SmartTrack stations. In November 2016, City of Toronto Council proposed funding SmartTrack 
through a combination of; Federal government contributions, Tax Increment Financing, 
development charges, property tax increases or equivalent sources of annual revenue. Because 
the TIF Act (2006) does not have regulations for its implementation, Mayor John Tory 
announced SmartTrack will partially be funded through a municipal version of TIF.  
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Figure 4 TIF Zones (City of Toronto, 2018) 
There are sixteen ‘primary development’ areas along the SmartTrack corridor, six of 
which are located around new SmartTrack stations and ten around existing Go/RER stations 
(City of Toronto, 2018). The delineated TIF zones (Figure 4) are used to determine the 
incremental tax revenue associated with development near SmartTrack stations. The TIF zones 
are expected to experience increased development due to their proximity and integration with 
SmartTrack and Go/RER stations. City of Toronto Council published a report titled; 2019 
Property Tax Rates and Related Matters (2019) stating, “15% of all commercial and residential 
tax revenue from assessment growth in the SmartTrack Zones in each year be allocated to the 
SmartTrack Funding Reserve Fund, less any reduction for tax increment grants that may be 
payable in these zones, for a period of 25 years.” (p.16). Figure 5 showcases the City’s 
methodology in determining the net share of tax funds to be used towards SmartTrack. The net 
share of TIF tax allocated toward SmartTrack was based on a number of modelling exercises. 
The Strategic Regional Research Alliance (SRRA) estimates that roughly 40% of future 
development within SmartTrack areas will be a direct result of the project (SRRA, 2016). The 
City of Toronto Council Report (2019) determined that the increase in residential and non-
residential excess tax revenue would average a tax growth of approximately 39% (p.8). The 
combination of future development rates and share of attributable tax growth was used to 
formulate the 15% share of TIF zone tax growth allocated to a project (Figure 5).  City Council 
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is able to amend the current TIF rates should development surrounding SmartTrack stations 
underperform current projections.  
 
Figure 5 - Smart Track Funding Formula (City of Toronto, 2018) 
The City of Toronto Council report (2019) states that in 2019 SmartTrack zones 
produced $6, 233,113 in municipal revenue, resulting in $934,967 being allocated towards the 
SmartTrack Funding Reserve Fund (XR1731) (p.17). Although the $934,967 allocation does not 
seem like a large contribution in comparison to the New York and United Kingdom examples, it 
is important to remember Toronto TIF is accumulated at a 15% rate, relative to growth. Similar 
to the example of New York and the United Kingdom, as development increases within the 
project zone SmartTrack revenues will also increase. The City of Toronto Council Report (2019) 
estimates that over the next 25 years, TIF will provide $292 million towards funding the 
SmartTrack project. An interesting dichotomy is apparent in Ontario’s Provincial governance, 
and it directly relates to Tax Increment Financing. During Toronto’s mayoral race in 2014, John 
Tory proposed using TIF to fund the SmartTrack project, Doug Ford dismissed TIF as a non-
viable funding option (Moore, 2014). In 2019, Premier Ford announced a $28.5 billion 
investment for public transit projects however, the Ford Progressive Conservatives have also 
promised to eradicate Ontario’s budgetary deficit. Given the goal of a balanced budget, it begs 
the question if the Premier of Ontario and his government will revisit the TIF legislation to 
implement regulations. 
6. A Potentially Harmful Tax  
When property and land values increase, land value capture mechanisms become more 
lucrative. In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) argues that landlords can demand a 
premium for rent that has a received an improvement. In the current day, municipalities have the 
power to create and amend planning policies that can potentially augment property values. 
Crossrail in London initiated development projects with the private sector to create over-site 
developments above Crossrail Station stops. The City of New York implemented site specific 
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Zoning By-laws for the Hudson yards which allowed for increased densities and mixed-use 
development. In both London and New York, the announcement of new transit infrastructure 
augmented land values, spurring new development, however, little attention is paid to the 
gentrifying effects of land value capture.  
In 2014, residential sales within a mile of Crossrail stations grew by 21% and house 
prices within 500 m of a Crossrail station increased by approximately 27% (Hamptons 
International, 2014). A report by Sarah Arnold (2017) of the Guardian, interviewed local London 
residents and asked if improved commute times and enhanced local economics validated the 
increase in housing prices. One interviewee from Stratford, London, responded that, “Stratford 
seemed like the ideal combination of transport connections, affordability and things to do. I’d 
like to buy here eventually, so I hope Crossrail won’t make that as unaffordable as it is 
everywhere else.” (p.1). As the flows of capital seek to redevelop and rehabilitate blighted areas 
in the search of profit (Smith, 1996) it is possible for the gentrifying effects of Crossrail to reach 
Stratford. The effects of gentrification are also being felt amongst commercial businesses. One of 
London’s first day time gay bars, ‘First Out Café’, will be closing down after 25 years of 
business. The café was unsuccessful in renegotiating its lease coupled with the fact that the 
surrounding area is undergoing redevelopment associated with Tottenham Road Court station 
(Bindel, 2011).  
The New York times rightfully labelled the Hudson Yards project as a ‘playground for 
the 1%’ (New York Times, 2019). As highlighted in the previous section of this paper, unit 
affordability is not a strength of the Hudson Yards. The Abington House is one of the rental 
properties developed at the Yards, where a 2-bedroom and 2-bath apartment can cost from 
$6,940 to $9,550 a month (Related, 2019). Only 10% of the residential units available will be 
‘affordable units’ (New York Times, 2019), residents who meet the affordability requirements 
apply to be entered into a raffle to purchase a unit. Maintaining the theme of a playground for the 
1%, the condominium development 15 Hudson Yards, features separate entrances for luxury 
condominium owners and those whom live in affordable units (Paybarah, 2019). It is puzzling 
how the City of New York was able to rezone the entirety of the Yards to allow for luxurious 
towers, high-end shopping and restaurants, yet little action was taken to provide for more 
affordable units.  
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It was recently revealed by Matthew Haag (2019) of the New York Times, that a number 
of multi-national corporations were incentivized with millions of dollars’ worth of tax credits in 
exchange for taking tenancy at the Yards. One of the tenants is BlackRock, which is the largest 
money management firm in the world, and in 2018 managed over $5.98 trillion in assets and 
investments. The firm is eligible for $25 million in state tax credits if they provide 700 jobs to 
the Hudson Yards (Haag, 2019). A job creation tax incentive of $14 million was given to Warner 
Media, whereas L’Oreal was offered $5.5 million. Although tax incentives in exchange for job 
creation are not a new phenomenon, it has two effects on the City of New York. Firstly, well-
paying jobs found throughout other areas of New York are either being relocated or terminated 
to provide new opportunities at the Yards. Secondly, the tax incentives provided to Hudson Yard 
firms could be better used to provide affordable housing throughout the Yards or the City.  The 
next phase of development at the Hudson Yards is titled, The Western Yards. Due to the 
inadequate quantity of affordable lease/own options at the current site, I recommend that the City 
of New York or the Department of Housing Preservation and Development be proactive in 
encouraging Oxford and Related Companies to provide a greater ratio of affordable units.   
Solving affordability issues associated with land value capture is inherently difficult to 
combat. This is due to two reasons; transit investments are proven to augment land values. 
Secondly, if land values do not increase, then the success of land value capture is jeopardized. 
Land value capture can assist in preventing land speculation by taxing unproductive land 
however, it can also gentrify communities and displace local residents. Although solving issues 
of gentrification and displacement caused by LVC are outside of the scope of this paper, more 
research is required to uncover approaches to mitigate affordability issues.  
7. Research Limitations 
There are a few limitations to my research paper, the first of which is the use of 
quantitative financial data. I sought to evaluate the effectiveness of different LVC approaches 
based on the total revenue collected per annum and the length of the debt repayment process for 
a given project. What I came to realize is that, analyzing the revenue generated by different land 
value capture mechanisms cannot adequately determine if a LVC policy was ‘successful’. There 
are different and complex economic, physical and political characteristics in London, New York 
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and Toronto, which inevitably affect the revenue generated by different LVC approaches to 
varying degrees. Each city example implemented a different form of LVC such as BRS in 
London, PILOT in NYC and TIF in Toronto, and each transit project varied in cost, size and 
scope, resulting in different revenue.  
One of the major achievements of my paper was uncovering why the Ontario Provincial 
government never implemented regulations for the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006). I was 
fortunate to conduct interviews with government policy advisors along with professors from the 
University of Toronto and Utrecht University. I do acknowledge a few limitations of first-person 
interviews; the first was the limited sample size of participants that were willing to discuss 
Ontario’s Tax Increment Financing Act (2006). Through networking I was introduced to a 
number of current and previous staff members of the Ontario Public Service that either worked 
on the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006) or were staff members for the Liberal Provincial 
Government when the TIF legislation was introduced.  I quickly came to learn that most public 
service staff were unwilling to share their experience of working on the Tax Increment Financing 
Act (2006), potentially indicating that there are underlying political pressures and lobby interests 
that influenced the legislation. Another limitation of my first-person interviews was that the 
arguments and statements provided as to why the Liberal Government never implemented 
regulations for the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006) were opinion based. Although I am 
convinced that their responses were truthful because their arguments corroborated each other’s 
explanations, there is no way of fact checking the statements provided by my interviewees.  
8. Conclusion 
The examples of London and New York exemplify that land value capture mechanisms 
like the Business Rate Supplement (BRS) and Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT), were effective 
at collecting revenue for their respective transit project. As of 2018 the total gross revenue from 
the BRS is approximately £1,833 billion, and the GLA estimates that the £4.1 debt to be repaid 
within 24-31 years. The Hudson Yards project and PILOT collections are currently in the early 
stages of revenue collection, the HYIC is projecting to collect roughly $31.5 million in PILOT 
payments in 2019. PILOT payments are expected to increase to $70.3 million in 2020, $83.8 
million in 2021 and $86.7 million in 2022 (HYIC, 2018). The HYIC has a contractual obligation 
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to pay off bonds by 2047, a feasible goal based on current PILOT projections and revenue from 
transferable development rights.  
Despite using different LVC policies, both cases exemplify similar characteristics 
necessary for LVC to succeed. First and foremost, a transit project assisted in augmenting land 
values. Over-site development in London and site-specific high density, mixed-use zoning in the 
Hudson Yards provided additional value to residential and commercial properties. Secondly, 
both London and New York have proper legislature that enabled the implementation of land 
value capture policies. The Business Rate Supplement Act was implemented at the Federal level 
in the United Kingdom, and the Municipal Redevelopment Act was passed by the State of New 
York. In contrast, the province of Ontario introduced the Tax Increment Financing Act in 2006, 
the bill subsequently received Royal Assent but never received regulations. First person 
interviews revealed that regulations for the TIF Act were not implemented for two potential 
reasons; a lack of bureaucratic-will when Minister Sorbara left the Ministry of Finance coupled 
with an unwillingness of the Province to share the revenue from the Education Tax Increment. 
Further research should seek to uncover the underlying influences and interests as to why the 
Province of Ontario never implemented regulations for the Tax Increment Financing Act (2006). 
While researching why there are no regulations for the TIF Act (2006) I reached out to former 
Ontario Premier, Dalton McGuinty and former Minister of Finance, Greg Sorbara, whom were 
kind enough to put me in touch with a few potential contacts. I quickly discovered that there is 
an unwillingness amongst past and previous provincial employees to openly discuss the topic, 
which remains to be the biggest obstacle for unveiling additional factors as to why regulations 
were not put in place. 
Legislation for the Business Rate Supplement Act was passed by the United Kingdom 
Federal Government in 2009 to ensure the BRS could be used for the Elizabeth Line.  The State 
of New York passed the Municipal Redevelopment Law in 1984, roughly 30 years prior to the 
inception of the Hudson Yards. Based on the case studies of London and New York, properly 
formulated legislature which mandates the use of different LVC mechanisms is required for LVC 
success. The City of Toronto has pursued a municipal version of tax increment financing to fund 
portion of the SmartTrack line. However, local transit agencies and municipalities would 
generate substantially more profit if they were given access to the Education Tax Increment as 
outlined in Ontario’s TIF Act (2006). The silver lining for Ontario’s TIF Act (2006) is that the 
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legislation has already received Royal Assent, time will tell if future provincial governments 
choose to implement regulations for the legislation.  
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